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INTRODUCTION
T ORT law, like virtually every other legal subject, has increasingly
come under scrutiny by scholars seeking to uncover hidden biases
based on race, gender and other important dimensions of personal
identity.! In law reviews and in final reports of gender and race bias
task forces, questions have been raised about the basic equity of legal
standards employed in torts suits, particularly how rules created
within a predominately white, male-dominated system often fail to
take into account the differing experiences of more marginalized so-
cial groups in society. Some scholarship has moved beyond criticism
of explicit legal rules to show how the law in action-the behavior of
judges, lawyers, expert witnesses and jurors-influences the value
placed on injuries suffered by particular classes of tort victims.2
The growing body of literature suggests that no dimension of tort
law has escaped the influence of gender or race, the two aspects of
personal identity examined in this Article. The four elements of the
negligence claim-duty, breach, causation and damages-derive their
meaning within specific cultural contexts in which understandings
about gender and race play a prominent role. Concepts of duty and
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. I am grateful to Pat Bauer, Mike
Green, David Jung and Joe Knight for their comments on an earlier draft and to
Nancy Hauserman, Dick Stevenson and Gerry Suchanek for their insights about the
role of expert witnesses. I also benefitted greatly from a faculty workshop on this
piece with my new colleagues at Pittsburgh. Many thanks as well to Andrea Kurtz,
Liza Diaz and Lisa Fisher for their research assistance.
1. For an excellent review of some of the feminist writings in the area, see Leslie
Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 575 (1993).
See also Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Inten-
tional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1988) (examining interlock-
ing systems of race, gender and class bias); Taunya L. Banks, Teaching Laws with
Flaws: Adopting a Pluralistic Approach to Torts, 57 Mo. L. Rev. 443 (1992) (critiquing
doctrine of consent); Jean C. Love, Discriminatory Speech and the Tort of Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress, 47 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 123 (1990) (discussing cases
of sexual, racial, ethnic, religious and sexual orientation harassment); Ann C. Shal-
leck, Feminist Legal Theory and the Reading of O'Brien v. Cunard, 57 Mo. L Rev. 371
(1992) (critiquing doctrine of consent).
2. See, e.g., Barbara Y. Welke, Unreasonable Women: Gender and the Law of
Accidental Injury, 1870-1920,19 L. & Soc. Inquiry 369 (1994) (assessing role of gender
in shaping the law of accidental injury); Barbara Y. Welke, The Social Foundations for
Non-Workplace Injuries in Negligence 1850-1920 (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) (same).
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breach, even when formulated in gender and race neutral terms, often
implicitly depend on a vision of the typical or standard person, who
turns out to be white, male and middle class. For example, the "rea-
sonable person" standard, a staple of tort law, is now recognized as a
problematic construct that needs to be unpacked to expose its non-
neutrality and propensity to reproduce the status quo.3
This new critique of tort law also has built upon the legal realists'
understanding of causation as a value-laden inquiry that cannot be
separated from considerations of social policy.4 Feminists and other
critical scholars claim that assessments of causation are influenced by
the identity of the injured parties and that causal attribution is a dy-
namic process, the product of cultural as well as intellectual develop-
ments.' Gender ideology may affect which injuries are regarded as
"remote" and which are classified as "proximate."6 The core notion
of "injury" also is being mined for its cultural and ideological dimen-
sions.7 The "discovery" of sexual harassment8 and the reconfiguring
of hate speech9 and pornography" as harms disproportionately in-
flicted upon women and racial minorities have the potential to gener-
3. For critiques of the reasonable person standard in both tort litigation and Title
VII harassment cases, see Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and
Tort, 38 J. Legal Educ. 3 (1988); Martha Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objec-
tivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sexual and Racial Harassment Litigation, 1 Tex. J. Wo-
men & L. 95 (1992); Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The
Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 Yale L.J. 1177 (1990); Lu-
cinda Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course, 1
Yale J.L. & Feminism 41 (1989).
4. See, e.g., Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 60
(1956) (discussing how policy considerations affect the determination of causation-in-
fact in tort actions).
5. See, e.g., Arthur F. McEvoy, The Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire of 1911: So.
cial Change, Industrial Accidents, and the Evolution of Common-Sense Causality (Oct.
7, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (relating attributions of cause
to changes in technology, political economy and culture).
6. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law
of Fright. A History, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 814, 824-34 (1990) (discussing miscarriages and
stillbirths caused by fright that were classified as "remote" and "unforeseeable").
7. See, e.g., Adrian Howe, The Problem of Privatized Injuries: Feminist Strategies
for Litigation (developing the notion of "social injury" to describe systematic harms
suffered by women), in At the Boundaries of Law: Feminism and Legal Theory 148,
148-49 (Martha A. Fineman & Nancy S. Thomadsen eds., 1991).
8. Two early influential texts on sexual harassment are Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination (1979) and
Lin Farley, Sexual Shakedown: The Sexual Harassment of Women on the Job (1978).
For an overview of the legal literature on sexual harassment, see Martha Chamallas,
Writing About Sexual Harassment: A Guide to the Literature, 4 U.C.L.A. Women's
L.J. 37 (1993).
9. See Mari J. Matsuda et al., Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assault-
ive Speech, and the First Amendment (1993).
10. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and
Law 127-214 (1987); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Only Words 3-41 (1993); Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Pornography as Defamation and Discrimination, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 793
(1991).
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ate a broader critical discussion about the inadequacy of traditionally
recognized categories of legal injuries.
In this Article, I examine gender and race bias in the calculation of
damages, specifically the assessment of loss of future earning capacity.
This element of damages is significant because it is frequently a sizable
component of a damage award." I contend that the courts, expert
witnesses and lawyers have uncritically relied on statistical data, pre-
mised explicitly on race and sex, to calculate loss of earning capacity.
This explicit use of race-based and sex-based economic data dramati-
cally reduces some damage awards for women and for African-Ameri-
can and Hispanic men.' 2 The effect for white male plaintiffs, in
contrast, is to set their recoveries at an unjustifiably high amount,
which perpetuates and recreates gender and race disparities in the dis-
tribution of personal income.' 3
Reliance on race-based and gender-based economic data to deter-
mine lost earning capacity is bad social policy. The use of race-based
and gender-based tables assumes that the current gender and racial
pay gap will continue in the future, despite ongoing legal and institu-
tional efforts to make the workplace more diverse and less discrimina-
tory. The use of these data allows discrimination in one area-the
setting of pay rates-to influence valuations in another area-the cal-
culation of personal injury awards. This bootstrapping magnifies the
impact of employment discrimination to the extent that current dis-
parities in earnings are traceable to discriminatory acts of employers.
It further impoverishes members of low income groups who find
themselves disabled from severe accidents.
Most importantly, the use of explicit race-based and gender-based
economic data is unconstitutional.' 4 I maintain that under current
doctrine, reliance on either race-based or gender-based tables in the
course of a judicial proceeding is state action sufficient to trigger con-
stitutional guarantees. On the merits, moreover, the possible justifica-
tions for using race-based and gender-based data fail to satisfy the
requisite constitutional standards. It is well settled law that racial clas-
sifications are suspect and cannot be used to disadvantage minorities,
absent a showing that the classification is necessary to further a com-
pelling governmental interest.' 5 Under the prevailing intermediate
scrutiny standard for explicitly gender-based classifications, individual
women are protected from damaging generalizations about their sex,
11. See, &g., Floyd v. Fruit Indus., Inc., 144 Conn. 659, 669-70 (1957) (noting that
destruction of earning capacity may be the "principal element of recovery" in wrong-
ful death of employed person); accord Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 382 F.
Supp. 1271, 1281 (D. Conn. 1974).
12. See infra notes 71-98 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 71-98 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 218-311 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 257-67. The leading case is Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 223 (1944).
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unless the state proves that the classification is substantially related to
the achievement of an important governmental objective.' 6 I contend
that there is no persuasive justification-certainly not one that quali-
fies as a compelling or important justification-for relying on race-
based or gender-based economic data in tort litigation. Equitable de-
termination of loss of future earning capacity can be made by individ-
ualized determinations which look at the particulars of a plaintiff's
situation. When such individualized determinations are not possible,
courts and experts should rely on inclusive, race-neutral and gender-
neutral statistical data.
My argument against the use of race-based and gender-based tables
to determine loss of earning capacity, surprisingly, is a novel one in
the United States legal commentary. American commentators have
not probed as deeply as our Canadian counterparts to test for the fair-
ness and distributional consequences of standard measures used in
computing loss of future earning capacity.' 7 The race and gender bias
in the computation of damages that I discuss in this Article has been
hidden, despite the fact that this practice relies on data explicitly pre-
mised on race and gender categories.
I suspect that this subject has not been debated because the subject
of damages generally tends to be neglected in the literature. The de-
termination of damages frequently is omitted from first year torts
classes. Legal academics, like myself, may shy away from discussing
damages because we lack the detailed knowledge of practicing attor-
neys and may not see the theoretical importance of the topic. In addi-
tion, issues in damage law are difficult to research. Relevant
discussion is typically buried in trial court opinions, consisting of a
small facet of one of several issues in a case, rarely highlighted as a
significant legal issue.
Aside from these practical obstacles, objections to the use of race-
based and gender-based economic data may not have surfaced be-
cause of ideological barriers. The economists who testify as expert
witnesses and the lawyers who try personal injury cases are unlikely to
be primed to identify race and gender inequities in a context totally
removed from a civil rights case. My research, ironically, reveals that
it is often the attorney for the female plaintiff who introduces gender-
specific data." Experts are unlikely to question the fairness of using
gender-based tables, particularly since such use is standard practice
outside the litigation context. I sense that lawyers and experts are
more hesitant to rely on race-based data, if only because, as a societal
norm, color blindness now is more widely accepted than gender blind-
ness. However, it is clear that race-based data have been used and
16. See infra notes 287-98. The leading case is Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976).
17. See infra notes 190-217.
18. See infra notes 141-45.
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there is no clear prohibition against the practice in the reported cases.
Significantly, there are no constitutional challenges to the use of race-
based or sex-based data in the reported American cases: the few dis-
cussions in the cases treat the issue as a common law, evidentiary
question. 19
What economists regard as an accurate measure of loss of future
earning capacity has dominated the legal determination. When the
inquiry is so pared down, there is little room for discussion of the eq-
uity of the process and little awareness that predictions about the fu-
ture involve social as well as economic judgments. The calculation of
loss of future earning capacity has not yet been significantly affected
by anti-discrimination principles, whether couched in constitutional or
general policy terms.
Despite the narrowness of the issue, the calculation of the loss of
future earning capacity has important theoretical and symbolic impli-
cations because it concerns the value placed on human potential.
When race-specific and gender-specific data are used, it signals that
white men are worth more, and reinforces beliefs that they will
achieve more than white women or minority men and women. In the
criminal context, a similar devaluing of the lives of racial minorities
has resulted in harsher sentences for defendants who kill or injure
white people.' In the employment context, devaluing of women's
contributions has led to a rejection of comparable worth in the
courts2' and the perpetuation of a huge gender gap in wages.' The
cumulative effect of these valuations is to project current disparities
into the next generation. When the reproduction process is invisible,
the disparities seem inevitable.
Part I of this Article reviews some standard formulations relating to
the calculation of loss of future earning capacity to determine the role
of gender-based and race-based data in these calculations. 3 Reliance
19. See infra notes 165-83.
20. A comprehensive study of racial disparity in sentencing directed by Professor
David Baldus showed that defendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3
times as likely to receive the death sentence as defendants charged with killing blacks,
even after controlling for 39 nonracial variables. David C. Baldus et al., Equal Justice
and the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis (1990). In McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,297 (1987), the Supreme Court accepted the statistical soundness
of the Baldus study but refused to regard it as sufficient proof of intentional discrimi-
nation in the individual case. For a discussion on the devaluation of the lives of black
victims, see Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 Yale LU. 420
(1988) and Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and
the Supreme Court, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1388 (1988).
21. See e.g., Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 709 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984); American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716,
723 (7th Cir. 1986); AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1985);
Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356-57 (8th Cir. 1977).
22. See infra notes 66-68. See generally Claudia Goldin, Understanding the Gen-
der Gap: An Economic History of American Women (1990).
23. See discussion infra notes 32-68 and accompanying text.
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on explicit gender-based and race-based economic data is most likely
to occur in cases in which the plaintiff has not established an individu-
alized record of earnings, generally when the plaintiff is a minor child.
In these cases, experts do not have enough information to select more
refined statistics, such as the level of earnings within a particular occu-
pation and the average rate of pay increases in such occupation.
There is no way to determine how often parties resort to gender-
specific and race-specific information or the precise impact this prac-
tice has on damage awards. Part II of this Article, however, reviews
empirical studies on the size of damage awards for male and female
plaintiffs and examines the commentary from the many task force re-
ports on gender or race bias in the courts in order to provide a general
idea of the consequences of this practice. 24 These data suggest that
the sizable wage gap between men and women, and between white
men and minorities is replicated in damage awards. We know that
loss of future earning capacity is an important factor in producing
these disparities, even if resort to explicit gender-based and race-
based data is relatively infrequent. I make the modest claim that the
practice of using such gender-based and race-based data should stop,
even if it is unlikely to have a great impact in reducing the size of the
disparity in damage awards between white men and less favored
groups.
Part III reviews cases that refer to race or sex in discussing calcula-
tion of lost earning capacity.' Although the discussions are sparse, I
conclude that only in the last five years have the courts questioned the
use of race-specific or gender-specific information. Two recent cases
from the United States-from the First Circuit26 and from the federal
district court in the District of Columbia 2 7-are notable for refusing
to rely on gender-specific or race-specific data.2" The one important
Canadian decision,2 9 by a trial court in Vancouver, rejected the use of
women's average earnings to calculate loss of future earning capacity
of a female plaintiff, relying instead on the average earnings of male
workers as an appropriate measure of the loss of earning capacity.
Part III also discusses the progressive Canadian scholarship on this
issue,3" the only commentary to identify gender and race bias as a
problem associated with the current methods of calculating lost earn-
ing capacity.
24. See discussion infra notes 69-98 and accompanying text.
25. See discussion infra notes 99-217 and accompanying text.
26. Reilly v. United States, 665 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1987), aff'd, 863 F.2d 149 (1st
Cir. 1988).
27. Wheeler Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 771 F. Supp. 427 (D.D.C. 1991).
28. See infra notes 165-84.
29. Tucker v. Asleson, Vancouver Reg. B871616 (B.C.S.C. Apr. 25, 1991)
(unreported).
30. See discussion infra notes 99-217 and accompanying text.
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Finally, Part IV contains the constitutional argument against the use
of race-specific or gender-specific economic data.31 This Article con-
cludes that if state action can be proven in this context, the constitu-
tional challenge is very strong on the merits.
I. STANDARD FORMULATIONS AND PRACTICES: Loss oF Fu-ruRE
EARNING CAPACITY
In both personal injury and wrongful death cases, juries are asked
to estimate loss of future earning capacity as part of the damage
award. As its name suggests, loss of future earning capacity compen-
sates for the loss of ability to earn money, for the fact that the accident
impaired plaintiff's (or decedent's) 32 earning power. This element of
damages is likely to be of significance in cases of severe injury, espe-
cially where permanent injury prevents a plaintiff from engaging in
the type or range of employment possible before the injury.
The basic strategy in calculating loss of future earning capacity is to
compare the amount the plaintiff was capable of earning before the
injury to the amount plaintiff is capable of earning after the injury.
The authorities are generally in agreement that this element of dam-
ages is aimed at compensating for loss of potential. Earning capacity
may be destroyed by a serious accident, even if plaintiff might never
have decided to work or might not have chosen the highest paying job
he or she was capable of attaining.33 By focusing on what plaintiff
could have earned rather than what plaintiff would have earned, the
courts have provided a theoretical basis for authorizing awards for
persons who do unpaid labor in the home or whose work is not other-
wise compensated through the market. One commentator has de-
scribed this kind of award as "an award for the value of the time of the
injured person, measured by a more or less objective measure. '
31. See discussion infra notes 218-314 and accompanying text.
32. Throughout this Article, I will use "plaintiff" to refer to the accident victim.
My argument against the use of explicit gender and race-based data is also applicable
to wrongful death actions. There are added complexities, however, when parents seek
to recover for the wrongful death of a child. Typically parents will have a statutory
right to recover for their "pecuniary injury" as a result of a child's death, including
loss of the child's services and future contributions. The courts have struggled with
valuing services of a child in the contemporary context where most children are a
financial liability rather than an asset to their parents. See Dan B. Dobbs, Law of
Remedies: Damages-Equity-Restitution § 8.3(4), at 433-36 (2d ed. 1993); \Vex S.
Malone, Torts in a Nutshell: Injuries to Family, Social and Trade Relations §§ 2-5 to
2-6, at 37-40 (1979). Proof of the decedent's future earning capacity is relevant to
determine the amount the child might have contributed to support aging parents.
Many states now allow the jury to consider the value of the child's companionship as
an element of pecuniary loss. Dobbs, supra at 441.
33. Marilyn Minzer et al., 2 Damages in Tort Actions §§ 10.30-10.34 (Matthew
Bender 1994); Jamie Cassels, Damages for Lost Earning Capacity: Women and Chil-
dren Last, 71 Can. B. Rev. 447, 448 (1992); Dobbs, supra note 32, § 8.1(2).
34. Dobbs, supra note 32, at 367.
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As a practical matter, however, the most common starting point for
calculating the lost earning capacity of adults is the plaintiff's estab-
lished earnings record. Current earnings are then used as the basis
for projecting future earnings levels.36 To arrive at this projection, it is
necessary to estimate both how many years the plaintiff would have
worked if he or she had not been injured (i.e., worklife expectancy)
and the amount plaintiff would have earned each year, adjusted for
probable wage increases or other fluctuations in earnings. Because
plaintiffs receive lump sum payments, the award must then be reduced
to present value. These calculations are complicated enough to justify
expert testimony on the issue. Typically, prior to trial, an economist
will prepare a formal report summarizing the calculations used to ar-
rive at a figure or figures for lost earning capacity, including a state-
ment of the assumptions employed and copies of relevant government
source documents providing statistical information. 8
When plaintiffs have an established work history, the process of cal-
culating loss of future earning capacity may be individualized, at least
to the extent that projections are based on the specific occupation in
which plaintiff was employed 9.3  Economists will look to plaintiff's
own earnings record as well as the average earnings in that occupation
to determine both the base annual income and the projected increases
in earnings. In these instances, it is possible, of course, to resort to
gender-based or race-based data specific to the occupation-for ex-
ample, the average income of female law professors or the average
rate of pay increases for black accountants. In my research, however,
I have not come across cases in which economists have relied on race-
based and gender-based earnings data in projecting future earning ca-
pacity for persons who have an established earnings track record.40
35. Minzer, supra note 33, § 10.22(3)(b); Evelyn E. Zabel, A Plain English Ap-
proach to Loss of Future Earning Capacity, 24 Washburn L.J. 253, 259 (1985).
36. Fringe benefits, such as pensions, social security, retirement and profit sharing
are included within the future earnings projections. Zabel, supra note 35, at 259 &
n.62.
37. Minzer, supra note 33, § 10.22(3).
38. Leo M. O'Connor & Robert E. Miller, The Economist-Statistician: A Source
of Expert Guidance in Determining Damages, 48 Notre Dame Law. 354, 356-57
(1972).
39. Paul M. Deutsch & Frederick A. Raffa, 8 Damages in Tort Actions § 110.11(1)
(Matthew Bender 1994).
40. This, of course, does not mean that gender or race has no bearing on the
amount of recovery. Insofar as women are likely to be clustered in low-paying female
occupations and minorities have a low representation rate in high-paying professional
job classifications, reliance on occupation-specific data will have a negative impact on
recoveries for women and minorities. Moreover, if individual plaintiffs have suffered
job discrimination because of race or sex, their individual earnings profile will be
lower than that of a white male counterpart; when the plaintiff's base salary is used to
project future income, past discrimination will negatively affect the earning capacity
calculation. In these last two cases, however, the impact of race or sex is indirect, in
that it is not directly traceable to an expert's or other participant's reliance on explicit
race or gender-based generalizations. Because my argument is premised on prevail-
[Vol. 63
TORT LITIGATION
In calculating the worklife expectancy of plaintiffs, even for plain-
tiffs with an established work history, economists often rely upon
race-specific or gender-specific worklife tables, which predict that wo-
men and racial minorities will spend fewer years in the labor force.'"
Worklife expectancy is distinct from life expectancy. Worklife expec-
tancy is derived from the working experience of all persons in the
plaintiff's gender or racial group; it incorporates rates of unemploy-
ment, both voluntary and involuntary, as well as expected retirement
age.42 The worklife tables provide an average for the group, reflecting
the historical pattern of actual years worked.43 Thus, for example,
even though women as a group live longer than men, the worklife
expectancy of women of all races is typically shorter than that of men.
Moreover, minority men have a shorter worklife expectancy, as well
as life expectancy, than white men." For example, data from the Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics regarding worklife patterns observed in 1979-
80 estimates that for eighteen-year-olds, the worklife expectancy of
white men was 38.8 years, compared to 32.8 years for black and other
men, 28.5 years for white women and 27.1 years for black and other
women.
45
Particularly in some older cases, there is also a related assumption
that women will remain out of the labor force for several years to raise
children. This assumption has provided the justification for discount-
ing a damage award for a female plaintiff to account for the average
female's childbearing years46 or simply for the "negative" contingency
of marriage.47 Similar discounts have not been made for men who
ing constitutional principles, I am not challenging conventional valuation practices
that have a negative impact on women and minorities if they are not the product of
explicit race or gender-based classifications. A more thoroughgoing argument against
individualized assessments of future earning capacity based on their tendency to
reproduce current patterns of gender and race stratification has been made by Jamie
Cassels. See Cassels, supra note 33, at 485.
41. See, e.g., Deutsch & Raffa, supra note 39, § 110.13 tbls. 7b2 (comparing white
men and black men), 7b.5 (comparing white women and black women).
42. See Dale Funderburk, Worklife Tables: Are They Reliable?, Trial, Feb. 1986, at
44. See also, Dobbs, supra note 32, at 467; Marvin R. Brains & Norfleet W. Rives, Jr.,
The Determination of Economic Loss in Tort Cases: The Relative Impact of Sex and
Race, 6 J. Contemp. L. 121, 125 (1979) (describing working life tables published by the
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics which provide gender-specific projections).
43. Deutsch & Raffa, supra note 39, § 110.13.
44. Id. § 110.13 tbl. 7b.2.
45. Id.; see also Funderburk, supra note 42, at 44-45 (using 1977 data, worklife
expectancy for women is 27.5 years, compared to 37.9 years for men).
46. Caron v. United States, 410 F. Supp. 378 (D.R.I. 1975) (P's expert exempted a
10 year furlough period from his computations to account for the average female's
child-bearing years). Cf Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, 382 F. Supp. 1271, 1286 (D.
Conn. 1974) (determining that eight years is the "middle of the range of a professional
woman's likely hiatus from her principal occupation in order to raise a family").
47. Frankel v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 466 F.2d
1226, 1229 (3d Cir. 1972) (predicting that attractive plaintiff would marry and bear
children "with consequent substantial interruptions of gainful employment"). For a
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were expected to marry and have children without affecting their
working life. Significantly, in discounting awards for the negative con-
tingency of marriage or child rearing, courts have deviated from the
principle of compensating for earning "capacity." Presumably, a wo-
man or other person who cares for children in the home still retains
her capacity to earn money in the labor market, even if she decides
not to exercise that capacity. The fact that defendant's conduct has
denied plaintiff the option of paid employment is eclipsed in these
cases by an assessment of "probabilities" grounded on gender-based
generalizations.
Aside from gender-based discounts or contingencies, experts tend
most often to resort to gender-based and race-based statistics when
the injured party has only a limited or nonexistent work history.4
Most of the cases involve injury or death of children.49 Similar tech-
niques, however, could be used to calculate loss of earning capacity if
plaintiff's employment record was sporadic and it was not easy to des-
ignate his or her line of work.
In a recent practitioner-oriented publication by Matthew Bender,
Paul M. Deutsch and Frederick A. Raffa have set forth a detailed pro-
cedure for economists to use in calculating lost earning capacity in
cases in which the plaintiff has no established earnings record.50 The
authors recommend using gender-based and race-based statistics for
each of two proposed methods of calculating the base annual earnings
level of the plaintiff.5 Under the first method, the initial step is to
predict the level of educational attainment plaintiff would have
achieved. This can be done by "neutral" means,53 such as subjecting
plaintiff to aptitude testing and taking into consideration the socio-
economic status of the family, including the educational level of the
parents and siblings and the ability of the family to finance higher
education. 4 The authors then recommend that the economist consult
gender-specific and race-specific government data listing the average
earnings of high school or college graduates, respectively. At this
point, race or gender has a very significant influence on the calcula-
tion of lost earning capacity. The tables presented in the text for this
discussion of the unfairness of using a marriage contingency in cases of female plain-
tiffs, see Cassels, supra note 33, at 453-58.
48. Deutsch & Raffa, supra note 39, § 110.11(2).
49. See cases cited infra notes 100-90.
50. Deutsch & Raffa, supra note 39, § 110.11(2).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. I call this step "neutral" because the judgments about probable educational
attainment are not premised explicitly on the race or sex of the plaintiff. However,
because of the high correlation between minority race and lower socio-economic sta-
tus, assessment of the future educational attainment of minority children will likely be
negatively affected by the socio-economic situation of their families.
54. Deutsch & Raffa, supra note 39, § 110.11(2).
55. Id.
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purpose are the P-60 Series (for 1977-90) from the Current Population
Reports published by the United States Bureau of the Census.56 The
average earnings are broken down into black and white and male and
female.57 For example, the figures for high school graduates in 1990
are: white men, $16,236; white women, $14,064; black men, $13,574;
black women, $12,322.58 As was the case for most government data
collections for these periods, race is reduced to either black or white;
there is no separate breakdown for other racial/ethnic groups.59 The
suggested table for college graduates contains only a gender break-
down, giving separate data for male and female B.A.s by curriculum."
For example, the average monthly salary offer for a man with a B.A.
in psychology in 1990-91 was $1,830, compared to a female with the
same degree who received an average offer of only $1,640.61
The second approach the authors recommend to calculate lost earn-
ing capacity relies even more heavily on explicit gender and race clas-
sifications. Rather than resort to individualized factors to determine
probable educational attainment, the authors state that economists
may choose to consult data from the U.S. Commerce Department that
gives the average educational levels by the sex and race of the plain-
tiff.62 The relevant table, for example, shows the median school years
completed for white men age twenty-five years or older in 1988 was
12.8, compared to 12.6 for white women and 12.4 for black men and
women.63 As under the first method, once the probable educational
attainment is predicted, reference would again be made to gender-
based and race-based tables to calculate probable earnings.' 4
Resort to race-specific or gender-specific data potentially can have
enormous consequences for plaintiffs in tort actions. A colleague of
mine-Professor Richard Stevenson from the University of Iowa's
56. Id
57. Id.
58. The mean earnings for all high school graduates of both sexes and races is
$15,009. Deutsch & Raffa, supra note 39, § 110.11(2) tbl. 110-2.
59. The most recent P-60 Series of the Current Population Reports, Money In-
come of Households, Families, and Persons in the United States: 1991 includes a
breakdown by gender and for white, black and Hispanic persons. See United States
Department of Labor, Money Income of Households, Families, and Persons in the
United States: 1991, in P-60 Series of the Current Population Reports (1991). There is
no separate listing for Asian or Native American. For a discussion of the various
types of public data that can be used to calculate future earning capacity, see Law-
rence Hadley & John Rapp, Estimating Future Lost Earnings: Some Common
Problems, Trial, Feb. 1985, at 28.
60. The source the authors recommend is the College Placement Council's Salary
Survey. Deutsch & Raffa, supra note 39, § 110.11(2).
61. Id tbl. 110-3a.
62. Id. § 110.11(2), at 110-8.
63. Id tbl. 110-1. The source of the data is the P-20 Series of the Current Popula-
tion Reports, Population Characteristics: Educational Attainment in the United States
and the Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1990 (citing data for 1988, 1989 and
1990).
64. Deutsch & Raffa, supra note 39, § 110.11(2), at 110-8 to 110-9.
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College of Business Administration-who has been employed as an
expert in several cases, calculates the projected lifetime income, dis-
counted to 1990 present value, of a female college graduate as
$1,174,772, compared to a male college graduate's projected income
of $1,815,850.65 This means that if two children, a boy and a girl, with
the same educational prospects were each permanently disabled by an
injury, the girl's award would be only sixty-five percent of the boy's
award, a disparity attributable solely to gender.
The size of the male-female disparity in the above calculation is not
surprising if one considers the size of the current wage gap. In 1991
for full-time, year-round workers, the median income of white men
was $30,266, compared to $22,075 for black men and $19,771 for men
of Hispanic origin.6 6 The median income for white women was
$20,794, compared to $18,720 for black women and $16,244 for wo-
men of Hispanic origin.67 Expressed as a percentage of the median
income for white men, black men receive seventy-three percent; His-
panic men, sixty-five percent; white women, sixty-nine percent; black
women, sixty-two percent; and Hispanic women, fifty-four percent.68
Reliance on gender-specific and race-specific data to calculate loss of
future earning capacity assures that predictions about the future are
tied to present disparities, disparities which are sizable and reinforce
the dominant economic position of white men in the American
economy.
II. EMPIRICAL STUDIES
In the trial of actual cases, however, juries are not bound to accept
an expert's calculation of lost future earning capacity.69 There is also
no requirement that expert testimony be presented in every case; the
decision lies within the discretion of the trial court.70 Thus, there is no
precise way to calculate the influence that reliance on gender-based
and race-based data exerts in tort litigation or to measure the differ-
ence it would make in practice if only gender-neutral and race-neutral
data were used.
The available empirical data do confirm, however, that awards re-
ceived by women and minorities tend to be smaller than those re-
65. Interview with Professor Richard Stevenson of the University of Iowa, College
of Business Administration, in Iowa City, Iowa (Aug. 25, 1993).
66. See United States Department of Labor, supra note 59.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 167 (1st Cir. 1988); see also Renaldi v.
New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 230 F.2d 841,845 (2d Cir. 1956); Gonyer v. Russell, 160 F.
Supp. 537, 540 (D.R.I. 1958).
70. Minzer, supra note 33, § 10.22(6)(b), at 10-107 to 10-108. However, an attor-
ney's negligent decision not to obtain an economic expert witness in a personal injury
or wrongful death suit can form the basis of a malpractice claim. Waldman v. Levine,
544 A.2d 683, 690 (D.C. 1988).
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ceived by white men and that the disparity is likely traceable, in part,
to lower awards for loss of future earning capacity. Some of these
data have been generated by the movement to study race and gender
bias in the courts.7' Task forces in at least eleven states have pub-
lished reports that discuss gender bias in civil damages." Three re-
ports have discussed racial bias in tort cases involving minority
plaintiffs.73 Although there have been only a few independent studies
of damage awards undertaken by the task forces, the discussions in
those reports also provide useful reviews of the empirical data and
offer insights into the perceptions of lawyers, judges and other partici-
pants on the impact of gender and race in civil litigation.
Most empirical studies indicate that women receive significantly
lower damage awards than men. For example, a study of wrongful
death cases between 1984 and 1988 conducted by the Washington
State Task Force on Gender and Justice in the Courts ("Washington
Report on Gender") found that the mean damage award for a male
decedent was $332,166, compared to a mean award of $214,923 for a
woman7 4 Because these figures are unadjusted, there is no way to
estimate how much of the disparity was attributable to neutral factors,
such as age at the time of death. The authors of the Washington Re-
port on Gender hypothesized, however, that a "significant factor" pro-
71. For descriptions of the work and experiences of the various gender and race
bias task forces, see Lynn Hecht Schafran, Educating the Judiciary About Gender
Bias: The National Judicial Education Program to Promote Equality for Women and
Men in the Courts and the New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force on Women in the
Courts, 9 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 109 (1986); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Gender and Justice:
Florida and the Nation, 42 Fla. L. Rev. 181 (1990); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Issues and
Models for Judicial Education About Gender Bias in the Courts, 26 C. Rev. 32 (1989);
see also Judith Resnik, Gender Bias: From Classes to Courts, 45 Stan. L Rev. 2195
(1993).
72. See Colorado Supreme Court Task Force on Gender Bias in the Courts, Final
Report (1990); Illinois Task Force on Gender Bias in the Courts, the 1990 Report
(1990) [hereinafter Illinois Report]; Iowa Equality in the Courts Task Force, Final
Report (1993) [hereinafter Iowa Report]; Kentucky Task Force on Gender Fairness in
the Courts, Equal Justice for Women and Men (1992); Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court, Report of the Gender Bias Study of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court (1989); Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force for Gender Fairness in the
Courts, Final Report (1989), reprinted in 15 Win. Mitchell L. Rev. 825 (1989) [herein-
after Minnesota Report]; New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force on Women in the
Courts, First Year Report (1984), reprinted in 9 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 129 (1986);
New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, Report (1986), reprinted in 15 Ford-
ham Urb. LJ. 3 (1986-87); Rhode Island Committee on Women in the Courts, the
Final Report (1987); Washington State Task Force on Gender and Justice in the
Courts, Report (1989) [hereinafter Washington Report on Gender]; Wisconsin Equal
Justice Task Force, Final Report (1991).
73. See Iowa Report, supra note 72; New York State Judicial Commission on Mi-
norities, Report (1991); Washington State Minority and Justice Task Force, Final Re-
port (1990) [hereinafter Washington Report on Minorities].
74. Washington Report on Gender, supra note 72, at 89-90; see also Jane Good-
man, et al., Money, Sex, and Death: Gender Bias in Wrongful Death Damage Awards,
25 L. & Soc'y Rev. 263, 268-70 (1991) (discussing Washington Report on Gender).
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ducing the disparity was the real difference in the earnings of men and
women and the assessment of lower worklife expectancy for women,
based on women's lower rates of participation in the labor force.7 s
The Report did not specifically mention the practice of reliance on
gender-based income tables76 but seemed instead to accept gender
disparities in future earning capacity as a given:
Despite the fact that there are federal statutes prohibiting discrimi-
nation in pay on the basis of sex, data indicate that women workers
generally earn less per year than men, even though employed in the
same occupation. Thus the economic value of women may be con-
sidered less than that of men in determining damages in wrongful
death cases.77
The disparities in awards found in the Washington Report on Gen-
der have been replicated in other studies. A nationwide study, con-
ducted by Jury Verdict Research, Inc., of jury awards in personal
injury cases showed that women in all age groups except two (age
groups sixty to sixty-four and over eighty) received significantly lower
mean and median awards for compensatory damages than men did.78
For example, for ages twenty to twenty-nine, women received an aver-
age award of $76,117, compared to $236,869 for men in the same
group.7 9 A Rand Corporation study of damage awards in air crash
cases found "strong, consistent differences in loss and compensation
by sex."8 The authors concluded that the "disparity [in awards] re-
sults largely from differences between the sexes in income, work-life
expectancy, and salary growth."'"
Even in the one empirical study that adjusted for the current salary
level of the plaintiffs, women received considerably lower awards than
men did.8" This study by the Rand Corporation analyzed wrongful
termination awards in California between 1980 and 1986.83 The re-
port concluded that the disparity was likely traceable to generalized
assumptions about women's economic potential, specifically expecta-
tions of a lower salary growth curve or lower expected labor force
participation by women.'
75. Washington Report on Gender, supra note 72, at 87.
76. The report did note that "working life tables for women are based on current
labor force participation rates and may underestimate future work durations." Id.
77. Id. at 87-88.
78. 5 Jury Verdict Research, Inc., Personal Injury Valuation Handbooks: The
Aged as Plaintiffs, pts. I & 11 (1987), cited in Illinois Report, supra note 72, at 180-81.
79. Id.
80. Elizabeth M. King & James P. Smith, Economic Loss and Compensation in
Aviation Accidents ix (1988).
81. Id.
82. James N. Dertouzos et al., The Legal and Economic Consequences of Wrong-
ful Termination 31 (1988).
83. Id. at 19.
84. Id.
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The research on the effect of race on damage awards is less volumi-
nous. In an empirical study on racial equity in damage awards con-
ducted by the Washington State Minority and Justice Task Force,
substantial disparities were found between settlement amounts in as-
bestos cases involving minority and non-minority plaintiffs.s The
Washington study controlled for type of disease, general occupation
and age. Minorities received statistically significant lower average set-
tlements than non-minorities overall; the pattern held true for most
specific diseases and within occupations.8 6 Another report by the
Rand Corporation of state and federal civil jury trials in Cook County,
Illinois from 1970-79 found that African-American plaintiffs received
smaller awards, totaling "only 74 percent as much as white plaintiffs
received for the same injury."'" I have not found any empirical re-
search separately analyzing damage awards for racial minorities other
than African-Americans.s
The qualitative evidence generated by the gender and race bias task
forces-typically survey comments from attorneys and judges-has
targeted calculations of loss of future earning capacity as a potential
source of the disparities in damage awards. 89 However, the reports
rarely focus on the importance of gender-based and race-based eco-
nomic data; most of the discussion concerns the problem of compen-
sating homemakers fairly for the economic value of their services and
85. Washington Report on Minorities, supra note 73, at 123-25.
86. Id.
87. Audrey Chin & Mark A. Peterson, The Institute for Civil Justice, Deep Pock-
ets, Empty Pockets: Who Wins in Cook County Jury Trials 40 (1985) (published for
the Rand Corporation Institute for Civil Justice, R-3249-IC). The report also found
that disparities were greater for plaintiffs with major injuries. For example, the esti-
mated wrongful death awards for a white person killed in an automobile accident was
$79,000 compared to $58,000 for a black person in a similar case. Id. at 38-39.
88. The Rand study from Cook County defined "white" to include Hispanics,
Asians and Native-Americans. Id. at viii n.1.
89. The Task Force reports also have considered whether awards for pain and suf-
fering reflect gender bias or gender stereotyping. There is a widespread belief, for
example, that female plaintiffs are more likely to receive higher amounts for disfig-
uring injuries than male plaintiffs. Minnesota Report, supra note 72, at 78-79; Illinois
Report, supra note 72, at 183-89. Women also may receive higher awards for sexual
embarrassment or humiliation than men. A jury in Iowa, for example, awarded
$200,000 to a woman and only $100,000 to a man for invasion of privacy when a two-
way mirror was discovered in the couple's motel room. Charles Bullard, $4.3 Million
Awarded in Mirror Case, Des Moines Reg., June 26, 1992, at 2A. Male plaintiffs, on
the other hand, may benefit from the societal view that places a higher value on a
man's loss of strength and his capacity to do manual labor than the corresponding loss
in a woman. Illinois Report, supra note 72, at 186.
In this Article, I focus only on loss of earning capacity. I have not attempted to
determine whether or to what degree higher awards to women plaintiffs for pain and
suffering might possibly offset lower awards for loss of earning capacity. The large
disparity in overall awards between men and women, however, suggests that any off-
set is not considerable.
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the problems of combatting juror stereotypes about women and
minorities. 90
The report from the Illinois Task Force on Gender Bias ("Illinois
Report") is notable for raising the concern that reliance on generaliza-
tions about women's economic potential is problematic, even when
supported by statistical data.91 Based on round-table discussions with
attorneys, judges and arbitrators, the task force reported that jurors
often assume that women's labor force participation will be less than
men's, either because women will take substantial time out of the la-
bor force to give birth and care for children or will work less hours
than men per year.92 The report expressed the view that such assump-
tions might prevent fact finders from judging the plaintiff as an indi-
vidual based "on the facts of her particular case, unfiltered through
historical or societal biases."'93 The report also faulted the use of sta-
tistics based on past experience to predict future patterns. The basic
concern seemed to be one of accuracy:
[S]tatistical models for predicting women's work habits ... "fail to
capture the rapid, sustained increases in women's labor-force partic-
ipation, and they underestimate future labor-force participation, es-
pecially for younger women." . . . Thus, if assessments of female
plaintiffs' future income are based upon static assumptions drawn
from past employment patterns which are rapidly changing, damage
awards may be unfair not only to the individual plaintiff but also to
younger women as a class. 94
The Illinois Report stopped short, however, of challenging the legit-
imacy of using explicitly gender-based statistics and made no recom-
mendations on this point. The concerns in the report presumably
could be met in individual cases by allowing expert testimony about
changing patterns of women's labor force participation and by permit-
ting the expert to estimate how much of the wage gap between men
and women would decrease in the future.
The only report that deals specifically with the issue of the constitu-
tionality of gender-based and race-based economic data is the report
from the state of Iowa. 95 I served on the subcommittee that consid-
ered the issue of gender and race equity in damage awards. We first
considered the constitutionality question in connection with a written
90. See, e.g., New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force on Women in the Courts, First
Year Report (1984), reprinted in 9 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 129, 145 (1986) (stating that
homemakers are undercompensated because substantive law of damages tied to wage
earners); Illinois Report, supra note 72, at 186 (noting stereotype that values loss of
strength and capacity to do manual labor more highly for men).
91. Illinois Report, supra note 72.
92. Id. at 187.
93. Id. at 189-90.
94. Id. at 190 (quoting Elizabeth King & James Smith, Economic Loss and Com-
pensation in Aviation Accidents ix (1988)).
95. Iowa Report, supra note 72.
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comment received from a respondent in the survey of Iowa attorneys,
who recounted his experience as the attorney for the estate of two
black men:
I represented the estates of two black men killed in an automobile
accident in a wrongful death action. The defense attempted to in-
troduce probate inventory data to show that black laborers died
with 1/3 the estate assets as compared to white laborers whose char-
acteristics were otherwise identical. This would have supported re-
turning a dramatically lower verdict on the "projected
accumulations" element, and made black life cheaper to take than
white. I was able to get the inventory data excluded on relevancy
grounds. However, the economic experts themselves were prepared
to present testimony that used race-based statistics to reduce pro-
jected accumulations for a black man by about 40% under the white
level. I was able to get the economist to revise his testimony based
on racially-neutral data.96
In discussions, two of the subcommittee members, a lawyer and a
judge, reported that they had participated in cases involving minority
plaintiffs in which race-based economic data were admitted. The sub-
committee's report questioned the constitutionality of the practice of
using gender-based or race-based statistics 97 and made the following
recommendation, ultimately endorsed by the full Task Force:
The use of race-specific or sex-specific economic data or expert tes-
timony premised on such data is inequitable. Because minorities
and women often have earned less than white men for doing the
same or equivalent work, the use of race- or sex-specific economic
data to predict future earnings tends to perpetuate past discrimina-
tion. As a result, the lives and health of minorities and women are
undervalued. The Task Force recommends that only race-neutral
and gender-neutral economic data be used to evaluate damages in
civil cases. 98
III. CASES AND COMMENTARY
The concern for the use of gender-specific and race-specific eco-
nomic data has only surfaced in reported cases within the last five
years. Prior to that time, the courts accepted the premise that awards
to female plaintiffs could properly be based on statistics reflecting eco-
nomic patterns for women only. In the few cases I have found which
mention race-based tables, the courts permitted calculations of future
earning capacity to be based on race-specific data. Only recently
when a court was forced to choose an appropriate data source to cal-
96. Id. at 118-19.
97. Id. at 119.
98. Id. at 120.
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culate loss of future earning capacity in the case of a severely injured
bi-racial child did it squarely reject the use of race-based statistics.99
A. Gender-Based Data: Traditional Cases
The 1970 case of Frankel v. United Statesl°° is a good example of the
traditional approach to calculating loss of future earning capacity for
women. The court in Frankel was willing to assume that a woman
would have a much shorter worklife expectancy than a man-that a
woman, but not a man, would spend several years out of the work-
force during her married life.1°1 The principal plaintiff in Frankel was
a nineteen-year-old woman, Marilyn Heym,'02 who suffered severe
brain damage as a result of an automobile accident." 3 At the time of
Heym's injury, she had completed two years of a four-year course in
commercial art at the Academy of Fine Arts in Philadelphia." 4 Her
father was a commercial artist. Her two brothers were embarked on
professional careers: one was an engineer, and one was in medical
school.' She generally did well in school and excelled in art.106 De-
spite the evidence that Heym was on her way to a career in commer-
cial art, the court in this non-jury trial concluded that Heym would
likely become a wife and mother, and calculated her loss of earning
capacity taking this negative contingency into account:
Marilyn's life of 19 1/2 years, prior to her devastating injuries,
presents a clear picture of prospects for marriage. She was attrac-
tive, healthy, talented, well-adjusted, and intelligent. From the age
of six she was interested in horses and became a proficient rider,
winning many awards. She attended and participated in many horse
shows. These and school and other activities brought her in contact
with the opposite sex. She enjoyed male companionship. She en-
joyed teaching others to ride and engaged in hunts with others 15
99. Wheeler Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 771 F. Supp. 427, 455 (D.D.C. 1991).
100. 321 F. Supp. 1331, 1337-38 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub nom, Frankel v. Heym,
466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972). Several of the cases discussed in this section involve
claims against the United States government. Perhaps because there are no jury trials
under the Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1988), the damages issue has
been brought to light in these cases through trial court opinions and appellate review
of trial court findings. Most tort cases, of course, will involve jury trials in state
courts. See Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 Md. L. Rev. 3,
20-22 (1986) (noting that there are 12 times as many tort jury trials in the state courts
each year as in the federal courts).
101. 321 F. Supp. at 1337-38.
102. The case is styled Frankel v. United States because Alvin H. Frankel was ap-
pointed as a guardian for Marilyn Heym, who was declared an incompetent. Id.
103. There was no question that Heym's injuries were totally disabling. Id. at 1336.
After the accident, her mental age was 5.13 years and her memory was worse than
98% of the population. Id. She became psychotic, obsessed with food and subject to
emotional outbursts. Id.
104. Id. at 1337.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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years of age and above. There was a likelihood of marriage and
motherhood in her future. Marriage probably would have inter-
rupted her career, but with her training she could have resumed her
career, if it had become necessary or desirable during or after
marriage.' °7
The economist who testified for Heym had projected her future
earnings at $237,630, based on the income of a commercial artist
working continuously until retirement.' The trial court's estimate,
only $125,000,109 was based on the assumption that Heym would
marry, bear children and interrupt her career. 1 0 The hefty discount
for marriage was upheld on appeal."' The appeals court held that it
was proper for the district court to assume, on the basis of "Miss
Heym's temperament and personality," that probably "she would
have married and borne children, with consequent substantial inter-
ruptions of gainful employment."" 2 Frankel thus authorized dimin-
ished awards to women because of the assumption that women will
not work as many years as men at compensated work," 3 despite wo-
men's longer life expectancy and despite the fact that loss of earning
capacity is supposed to measure potential, rather than probable
earnings.
Another case in the traditional mode, Caron v. United States,"4 per-
mitted lower awards to a woman even for those years in which the
court assumed that the woman would work full-time. Monique
Caron's injuries stemmed from the negligent administration of an
adult dosage of a typhoid injection in combination with other immuni-
zations when she was four months old." 5 The treatment produced
permanent retardation; at the time her parents sued for damages,
Caron was twelve years old," 6 but had the mental capacity of a child
of 4.5 years. 117
107. Id. at 1338.
108. Frankel v. Heym, 466 F.2d 1226, 1229 (3d Cir. 1972).
109. Reduced to present value, the award for loss of future earning capacity was
$62,000. Id.
110. Id. In support of its decision, the court cited Vincent v. Philadelphia, 35 A.2d
65 (Pa. 1944), for the proposition that reduced awards to women are proper because
of the "lower rate of wages ordinarily obtainable in the industrial world by women as
compared with men, and the likelihood of marriage and motherhood with their result-
ing effect on the girl's opportunity and capacity to continue through life as a wage
earner." Id. at 67.
111. Frankel v. Heym, 466 F.2d at 1229.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 410 F. Supp. 378 (D.R.I. 1975), aff'd, 548 F.2d 366 (1st Cir. 1976).
115. Id. at 385.
116. 548 F.2d at 367. The action was timely filed under the "discovery" rule
whereby tort plaintiffs are permitted to file suits years after an injury is sustained if
they institute an action when they reasonably discover or should have discovered that
defendant's negligence produced the harm. Id. at 368.
117. Id. at 367.
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Plaintiff's attorney did not contest the assumption that because
Caron was female, she would likely marry and interrupt her working
life." 8 In fact, plaintiff's own expert exempted a ten-year furlough
period from his computations to account for "the average female's
child bearing years."" 9 In computing plaintiff's earnings while she
was in the work-force, however, plaintiff's attorney argued that the
award should be based on the earnings of the average worker, rather
than on the earnings of the average female worker, as defendant con-
tended. 20 In support of using gender-neutral data, plaintiff cited "ex-
isting Federal and State legislation and the present trend toward
equality in employment.' 121 The court disagreed, however, and
awarded only $30,251 for lost earning capacity based on average fe-
male wages.122 The court purported to have no authority to consider
the factor of sex equity:
I am constrained to agree with the defense that the present value of
prospective earnings, female wages, before taxes must be used.
However sympathetic this Court may be to equality in employment,
it must look to the reality of the situation and not be controlled by
its own convictions. One does not need expert testimony to con-
clude that there is inequality in the average earnings of the sexes.
There is no criterion to help us predict when this unwarranted con-
dition will be remedied and as a consequence I feel compelled to
adopt the defendant's position .... 123
On appeal, it was defendant, rather than plaintiff, who contested
the damage award, arguing that the amount was purely speculative
because plaintiff had not proved that she would ever have gone to
work. 24 The appeals court refused to set aside the small amount for
future earning capacity, noting that "Monique cannot be blamed for
not being able to prove the exact amount of such loss. Here the court
allowed less than $1000 per year loss of earning capacity which cer-
tainly is no bonanza for her."'" The court went so far as to suggest
that the trial court had been unfair to plaintiff because she was female,
citing an earlier case in which an eight-year-old boy had been awarded
118. 410 F. Supp. at 398.
119. Id. The defendant argued that a longer furlough period was appropriate to
reflect the "average periods of unemployment due to economic conditions." Id. The
court rejected this argument, stating that "I do not believe that more than ten years
should be exempted in arriving at a figure. Of course, there is, in all this, an element
of conjecture. In all probability, there will be periods of unemployment, so too, it can
be said that Monique might not have had a ten-year child bearing furlough. I feel a
ten-year period to encompass both contingencies is eminently fair." Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 399.
123. Id. at 398.
124. 548 F.2d at 371.
125. Id.
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$87,500 for this element of damages."2 In a final cryptic sentence, the
court stated that "we see no reason to distinguish between the sexes,
as the Government indicates."'127 The court did not, however, explic-
itly condemn the reliance on female wages or the assumption of a
shorter worklife expectancy for women. To support its holding, the
court had only to reject defendant's contention that plaintiff should
recover nothing for loss of earning capacity because she lacked precise
proof of the type of employment in which she would have engaged.' z2
Despite the appeals court's ruling for plaintiff, Caron is an extreme
case in which the injured female child was doubly disadvantaged by
the court's gender-based assumptions. The amount of lost earning ca-
pacity was first reduced because of an assumption that women work
fewer years than men. 29 The use of average female wages then
served to reduce the amount further, based on the assumption that
women earn less than men when they do work outside the home.'3
In this case, gender had the effect of reducing future earning capacity
to only a small percentage of the total award ($30,251 out of total
award of $656,326).''
Additional precedents from the 1970s endorse the use of gender-
specific calculations of worklife expectancy and reliance on female
wages to project future earning capacity. 32 In Gilborges v. Wallace,'33
a case involving a devastating car crash injuring a high school senior,
plaintiff's expert witness testified as to three possible amounts in cal-
culating loss of earning capacity.1' The first two calculations were
based on the worklife expectancy of female high school graduates and
female college graduates, respectively, and on the average wage for
each group.135 The third calculation of $1,000,000 was based on the
income of a practicing veterinarian, the profession in which plaintiff
126. The case cited was Pierce v. New York C.R-R., 409 F.2d 1392 (6th Cir. 1969).
127. 548 F.2d at 371.
128. Id. at 370-71.
129. 410 F. Supp. at 398.
130. It is not clear from the published reports that the defendant's table of "female
wages" was based only on full-time, year round workers. If the table were based on
the earnings of all workers, the lower labor force participation rates for women would
have already been incorporated in the table, meaning that the plaintiff would have
suffered a double discount for the prospects of marriage and interruption of work.
For a discussion of the problem of double discounting, see Cassels, supra note 33, at
457-58; Elaine Gibson, The Gendered Wage Dilemma in Personal Injury Damages, in
Tort Theory 185, 198 (Ken Cooper-Stephenson & Elaine Gibson eds., 1993).
131. 410 F. Supp. at 399.
132. See Gilborges v. Wallace, 379 A.2d 269 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977); Mor-
rison v. Alaska, 516 P.2d 402 (Alaska 1973).
133. 379 A.2d 269 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
134. Id. at 276-77.
135. Id. The expert estimated that if plaintiff graduated from high school she would
have worked for 32 years at an average income of $10,500 a year. Id. at 277. He did
not, however, provide the jury with a gross amount of potential loss of earnings for
this possibility. Id. He estimated that if plaintiff attained a college degree, she would
have worked for 36 years and sustained a gross loss of approximately $540,00. Id.
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had expressed an interest.136 The expert also testified that plaintiff
would probably have become a veterinarian. 137 The jury apparently
agreed and awarded plaintiff $1,000,000.138
On appeal, the court reversed the damage award, holding that there
was not enough evidence to support the expert's opinion that plaintiff
probably would have become a practicing veterinarian. 139 Although
the appellate court did not specifically endorse the use of gender-
based tables, it gave its tacit approval by stating that the expert's testi-
mony as to plaintiff's likely losses, had she become a college graduate,
was supported by the evidence. 4 ° The effect of the appellate court's
ruling was to validate a lower gender-based award while maintaining
that plaintiff's chances of succeeding in a male-dominated field were
too speculative to support a jury verdict.
In these traditional cases, it is sometimes the female plaintiff who
offers gender-based statistics to counter defendant's claim that there is
insufficient evidence even to assume that plaintiff would enter the
work-force. The debate then centers not on whether plaintiff is enti-
tled to a higher amount derived from gender-neutral tables, but
whether any substantial sum should be awarded at all for loss of earn-
ing capacity. Morrison v. Alaska' 41 is such a case involving the use of
race-specific and gender-specific tables. The contested issue was the
trial court's assumption that the injured female teenager would likely
have worked for only five years as a secretary and then married, an
assumption which justified an award of only $40,000 for lost earning
capacity.' 42 Plaintiff's strategy for overturning the trial court's award,
which ultimately was successful, was to rely on gender-based and race-
based statistics showing that "the average, white Alaskan female, in-
cluding women both employed and unemployed, will earn about
$175,000 during her lifetime [and] the average white Alaskan female
who remains employed throughout her career will probably earn
$350,000 to $400,000.' 14 3
136. Id. The opinion does not state the worklife expectancy the expert used to
arrive at the $1,000,000 figure. Presumably the amount was based on the average
earnings of veterinarians.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 272.
139. Id. at 277. The dissent argued that the issue was fairly debatable and properly
left to the jury. Id. at 284-85 (Antell, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 277.
141. 516 P.2d 402 (Alaska 1973).
142. Id. at 404.
143. Id. at 405. The court ruled that the plaintiff was "entitled to recover the full
amount of her diminished earning capacity," including the amount of her earning ca-
pacity following marriage. Id. The court did, however, permit the trial court to allow
an "offset" reflecting the fact that plaintiff could still function to a degree as a house-
wife, even though she had lost the capacity to work in commercial enterprises. Id. at
405.
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In cases such as Morrison, it is impossible to tell whether plaintiff's
attorney never considered introducing gender-neutral figures or made
a deliberate, strategic choice to rely on the lower, gender-based figure
to appear reasonable and moderate to the court.'" The end result,
however, is that even prevailing female plaintiffs recover an amount
that is less than a similarly situated male plaintiff.145
In addition to cases endorsing gender-based tables, there are nu-
merous wrongful death cases in which the sex of a child is regarded as
a legitimate factor to determine the amount of the pecuniary loss suf-
fered by the surviving parents. The typical instruction on this issue
asks the jury to consider: "the age, sex and physical and mental char-
acteristics of the child, supplemented, when available, with evidence
as to the position in life and earning capacity of the parents, as well as
evidence as to the rendition, if any, of household services by the mi-
nor."'" The standard formulation suggests that the sex of the child is
relevant because of the assumption that sex is a good predictor of
earning capacity. Earning capacity in turn is relevant to calculate the
parent's pecuniary loss because it sets a limit on the amount the de-
ceased would have had available to contribute to family members.
This means that, all other things being equal, upon their death, female
children have less economic worth to their parents than male children.
This reasoning perpetuates, in diluted form, old notions of daughters
as liabilities to their families, in contrast to sons, who could be ex-
pected to increase the wealth of the family.
B. Race-Based Data: Traditional Cases
The few reported cases decided during the 1970s and 1980s that
used race-based tables resemble the traditional gender cases. The
courts and parties seem to accept race-based statistics uncritically, and
144. Indeed the strategy of introducing female wages might well have been prudent
for a plaintiff's expert. See Drayton v. Jiffee Chemical Corp., 591 F.2d 352, 361-64
(6th Cir. 1978) (reversing the trial court's award to a black female plaintiff because
her expert calculated loss of future earning capacity based in part on the average
earnings of male college graduates).
145. Some courts have not even permitted female plaintiffs to rely on gender-based
statistics, ruling that statistical evidence alone cannot support an award for lost earn-
ing capacity. See, e.g., Bulala v. Boyd, 389 S.E.2d 670, 677-78 (Va. 1990).
146. Eakelbary v. Nipper, Summit App. No. 9476 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980) (citing Im-
mel v. Richards, 93 N.E.2d 474, 475 (Ohio 1950)). See also Franchell v. Sims, 424
N.Y.S.2d 959 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980); King v. Louisville & N.R.R., No. 87-199-Il
(Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1987) (citing Crowe v. Provost, 374 S.W.2d 645 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1963)). Evidence of future earning capacity of the deceased is sometimes estab-
lished through expert testimony of an economist, although the courts have upheld
verdicts even in the absence of expert testimony. See, e.g., Taft v. Cerwonka, 433 A.2d
215, 220 (R.I. 1981) (discussing state librarian who testified as to worklife expectancy
of female high school graduate from actuarial tables and calculated loss of earning
capacity using decedent's father's salary as a base). Taft is curious in that the witness
apparently relied on a gender-based table to measure worklife expectancy, but not to
measure the average income of high school graduates. Id. at 215.
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there is no discussion of whether use of race-neutral data would be
preferable. The cases tend to focus instead on whether the use of sta-
tistical data is appropriate to measure loss of earning capacity of a
child, rather than on which statistical measure is appropriate.
In Morrison v. Alaska, discussed above,147 the court simply ac-
cepted plaintiff's expert testimony concerning the average income of
white Alaskan females, with no discussion of the propriety of using
racial data.'4 8 Similarly, in Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hos-
pital,49 the controversy centered on whether the evidence was suffi-
cient to sustain an award for a seventeen-year-old male, who
possessed only an eleventh-grade education and no special skills. Cal-
culating lost earning capacity posed some difficulty because plaintiff
had no established work history; his sporadic work record consisted of
some part-time work as a busboy and some manual labor.150 Over
defendant's objection, plaintiff introduced tables to estimate the po-
tential earnings of a person of plaintiff's "age, race, and education
with a full time job."' 51 The parties debated the admissibility of the
proffered statistics, without mentioning the salience of race. 52 The
only issue was whether to view plaintiff as a full-time worker. The
Johnson court did not even state plaintiff's race. Race, however, sur-
faced as a relevant factor because race-based tables were ultimately
used to determine future earning capacity.' 53
In Powell v. Parker,5 4 race-based tables were used to determine a
parent's loss in a wrongful death action. Similar to the gender cases, it
was plaintiff's expert who introduced race as a relevant factor to de-
termine lost earning capacity, basing his testimony on "decedent's age,
race, life expectancy, health, education, the life expectancy of his par-
ents, his work record and earnings, and his living situation," 55 includ-
ing statistical averages contained in government publications. 56
Plaintiff introduced the race-based statistics to counter defendant's
claim that the deceased's work record was too sporadic to justify an
award for lost earning capacity.' 57 Like the court in Johnson, the
147. See supra notes 141-46.
148. 516 P.2d 402 (Alaska 1973).
149. 294 N.W.2d 501 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
150. Id. at 527.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 523-27.
153. Id. at 527.
154. 303 S.E.2d 225 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983).
155. Id. at 228. Using race as a factor to measure the economic value of a deceased
child has also been uncritically accepted by commentators. See Douglas M. Foley,
Note, Infants, Lost Earning Capacity, and Statistics: Sound Methodology or Smoke
and Mirrors?, 13 Geo. Mason U. L. Rev. 827, 829 (1991).
156. The government publications, however, were not introduced into evidence.
303 S.E.2d at 228.
157. Id.
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Powell court did not reveal the race of the deceased but simply as-
sumed its relevance.
Race also has had a bearing on the estimate of the number of years
a plaintiff would have continued to work. The courts have allowed
experts to rely on race-based data to calculate worklife expectancy.15 8
One early case even insisted that an estimate based on race-neutral
data was improper.15 9
C. Impact of the Traditional Approach
The traditional acceptance of the use of race-based and gender-
based economic data creates a pattern of awards that replicates the
status quo by reinforcing the race privilege of whites and the gender
privilege of men. When the injured party is a woman, gender-based
statistics have been offered to provide a low (but not meager) figure
for loss of earning capacity. The principal concern for plaintiffs has
been to contest the damaging assumption that women are likely to
become homemakers rather than wage earners. In a case such as
Morrison,'160 where the plaintiff is a white woman, the use of gender-
based and race-based tables simultaneously disadvantages and advan-
tages the plaintiff. The race privilege ameliorates, but does not offset,
the gender disadvantage. Similarly for African-American men, the
use of race-based data depresses the award they receive below that of
white men. As men, however, they tend to benefit from use of gen-
der-based data. For minority women plaintiffs, the use of race-based
and gender-based tables produces a double disadvantage with no off-
setting advantage. Only white male plaintiffs stand to benefit consist-
ently from the use of race-based and gender-based tables, which yield
the highest possible damage estimate for this group.
D. New Directions in the Case Law: United States and Canada
The traditional view permitting the use of gender-based and race-
based tables has been questioned by three significant cases decided in
the last five years. 6' These new precedents challenge the propriety of
assuming that women have a shorter worklife expectancy than men as
well as the use of gender-based and race-based tables to establish av-
158. See Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1271, 1286 n.24 (D.
Conn. 1974) (using a mortality table for white females to determine earning capacity);
Gonzalez v. City of Franklin, 403 N.W.2d 747, 760-61 (Wis. 1987) (using a mortality
table for white males to determine earning capacity of Mexican citizen); cf Harlow v.
Chin, 545 N.E.2d 602, 612 (Mass. 1989) (using a mortality table for white males to
calculate future medical expenses).
159. O'Connor v. United States, 269 F.2d 578, 584 (2d Cir. 1959).
160. Morrison v. Alaska, 516 P.2d 402 (Alaska 1973).
161. Wheeler Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 771 F. Supp. 427 (D.D.C. 1991); Reilly
v. United States, 863 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1988); Tucker v. Asleson, Vancouver Reg.
B871616 (B.C.S.C. Apr. 25, 1991) (unreported).
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erage incomes.162 The solution proposed by a United States federal
district court has been to use only gender-neutral and race-neutral
data. 163 A Canadian court has opted to rely on the average income of
white men in an effort to establish a fair measure of earning capacity
for all groups.' 4 None of these cases, however, has cast the issue in
constitutional terms.
The first reported case seriously to challenge 65 the use of gender-
based statistics was the 1987 case of Reilly v. United States,166 tried by
the same judge-Judge Pettine-who, twelve years earlier, wrote the
very traditional opinion in Caron v. United States. 67 In Reilly, the
conflict was over how to estimate plaintiff's worklife expectancy:
plaintiff's expert based his estimate on an assumption that plaintiff
would have worked steadily until retirement age of seventy-forty-
eight years after starting at age twenty-two. 68 Defendant's expert re-
lied on statistics from the Bureau of Labor Statistics showing that wo-
men with fifteen or more years of education would only work twenty-
eight years from age twenty-two to age seventy, a forty percent reduc-
tion from plaintiff's figures. 169 In ruling for the plaintiff, Judge Pettine
rejected the assumption behind defendant's statistics that the past was
an accurate guide to the future:
I cannot accept... [the] reduction of Heather's estimated working
life by 40%. The reduction relies solely on a survey of women's
work histories between 1978 and 1980 .... As a factual matter, I
seriously doubt the probative value of such a statistic with respect to
twenty-first century women's employment patterns, particularly in
light of current, ongoing changes in women's labor force participa-
tion rates.' 7 0
Judge Pettine's analysis was accepted by the First Circuit.17 1 The
appellate court ruled that reliance on sex-based worklife expectancy
tables in this case was factually suspect and certainly not required by
law.'17  Although the court did not state that gender-based tables
could never be used, the reasoning in this case could easily be given
general application:
162. 771 F. Supp. at 455; 863 F.2d at 167.
163. 771 F. Supp. at 456-57.
164. Tucker v. Asleson, Vancouver Reg. B871616 (B.C.S.C. Apr. 25, 1991)
(unreported).
165. The appellate court in Caron v. United States, 548 F.2d 366,371 (1st Cir. 1976),
aff'g 410 F. Supp. 378 (D.R.I. 1976), however, did state, without elaboration, that it
saw "no reason to distinguish between the sexes."
166. 665 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1987), aff'd, 863 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1988).
167. 410 F. Supp. 378 (D.R.I. 1976).
168. 665 F. Supp. at 995.
169. Id. at 997.
170. Id. at 997 (citation omitted).
171. Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 165-67 (1st Cir. 1988).
172. Id. at 167.
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[A]ppellant's theory is questionable as a matter of fact. In an envi-
ronment where more and more women work in more and more re-
sponsible positions, and where signs of the changing times are all
around us, it can no longer automatically be assumed that women
will absent themselves from the work force for prolonged intervals
during their child-bearing/child-rearing years.173
After characterizing the assumption underlying the gender-based
tables as "sexist" and "antiquated," the court went on to rule that the
trial court was not bound to accept the defendant's statistics: "Death
and taxes, arguably, may be certain; statistics, though often a valuable
predictive aid, usually are not. The district court did not commit clear
error in refusing to yield to the government's suggested assumption
that a woman, invariably, works less and, therefore, earns less than
her male counterpart."174
Reilly is important for its willingness to look critically at gender-
based statistics regarding women's labor force participation. The ma-
jor theme is that women's work patterns are dynamic and that projec-
tions about future earnings that do not take into account trends
toward greater participation are unfair to women. 175 Reilly does not
take up the question of the propriety of using gender-based statistics
that might be sensitive to trends but which continue to reflect dispari-
ties among men and women.
The most far-reaching case in the United States to confront the is-
sues of race-based and gender-based statistics is Wheeler Tarpeh-Doe
v. United States,'7 6 decided in 1991. The dilemma was how to catego-
rize the earning potential of a bi-racial male child, Nyenpan Tarpeh-
Doe, whose father was Liberian and whose mother was white. The
plaintiff's expert used census tables to determine the income of an
American male college graduate." The defendant's expert argued
that the appropriate measure was "the average earnings of black men,
not those of all men.1178
The court refused to decide whether Nyenpan was black or white
for purposes of selecting the appropriate statistic." 9 Instead, the court
chose to examine the legitimacy of being forced to select-not only on
the basis of race, but on the basis of gender as well."s Its solution was
to base the calculation on gender-neutral and race-neutral data:
[I]t would be inappropriate to incorporate current discrimination
resulting in wage differences between the sexes or races or the po-
tential for any future such discrimination into a calculation for dam-
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. 771 F. Supp. 427 (D.D.C. 1991).
177. I& at 455. Plaintiff's expert calculated the lost income at $1,008,434. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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ages resulting from lost wages. The parties did not cite any
precedent on this question. Accordingly, upon request by the
Court, [defendant's expert] submitted a calculation of the average
earnings of all college graduates in the United States without regard
to sex or race.
181
The court's initiative had a significant impact on the amount of
damages that the plaintiff received. Because the average wage for all
persons was below that of both white men and black men, plaintiff
recovered less than even the amount argued for by the defendant?82
The objective of the court was to "eliminat[e] any discriminatory fac-
tors," whether stemming from gender or race privilege.18 3
The one Canadian decision to reject the use of female wages took a
different approach by designating male wages as the appropriate mea-
sure for both men and women." In Tucker v. Asleson,185 also de-
cided in 1991, the court ruled that the earning capacity of a severely
brain damaged twelve-year-old girl "should not be limited by statistics
based upon her sex. 1 816 The court reasoned that all occupations were
open to the plaintiff, stating that "[i]n Canada, no educational or voca-
tional opportunities were excluded to her. She could have become a
doctor, lawyer or business person. Or, in line with her childhood wish,
a veterinarian." 87 This predictive judgment led the court to accept as
an initial estimate of lost earning capacity the figure offered by plain-
tiff's attorney, which was based on the average lifetime earnings of
male university graduates ($947,000).18 Defendant's counsel argued
that the appropriate compensation for lost earning capacity was
$302,000, the average earnings for women. 18 9 Perhaps because neither
party argued for use of gender-neutral statistics, there was no discus-
sion of the propriety of designating male earnings as the fair value of
earning capacity for both sexes.
E. Canadian Commentary
The recent trend among courts to question the legitimacy of reli-
ance on gender-based and race-based data has not yet been examined
by commentators in the United States. A rich scholarship on the is-
181. Id.
182. Id. at 456.
183. Id.
184. See Cassels, supra note 33 (citing Ticker v. Asleson, Vancouver Reg. B871616
(B.C.S.C. Apr. 25, 1991) (unreported)).
185. Tcker v. Asleson, Vancouver Reg. B871616 (B.C.S.C. Apr. 25, 1991)
(unreported).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. The final award was not nearly as generous. Plaintiff recovered only
$350,000 because the court discounted the initial figure to take into account the possi-
bility that she would not obtain a university education. Id.
189. Id.
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sue, however, has been generated by a few scholars in Canada. 9° The
most recent Canadian commentary not only takes issue with the use of
explicitly gender-based and race-based data, but also broadly ques-
tions reliance on the market as the appropriate measure of loss.
The Canadian criticism began in 1978 with the publication of Ken
Cooper-Stephenson's Damages for Loss of Working Capacity for Wo-
men.191 A major premise of the article is that courts treat women un-
justly when they base awards of lost earning capacity on the current
depressed earnings level for women. Cooper-Stephenson analogized
the judicial reliance on gender-based statistics to basing an award for
lost earning capacity on a plaintiff's past receipt of illegal earnings.
He reasoned that "[i]f no award should be made condoning the re-
ceipt of illegal earnings, equally an award should not reflect ... low
job-opportunity on the part of women in a particular occupation by
comparison with men."'" Implicit in Cooper-Stephenson's argument
is the belief that men's wage levels represent a nondiscriminatory, fair
wage for all persons. Like the approach of the Tucker court,'9
Cooper-Stephenson would base awards to women on "an estimation
of what pay scale would be applied to a man with similar skills and
training as the female plaintiff possessed."' 94 His reforms respond to
what he regards as discriminatory features of the market, while not
rejecting the market as the basic measure of loss. 95
Cooper-Stephenson's early scholarship has recently been expanded
upon by two commentators who criticize the continued gender dispar-
ity in damage awards for catastrophic injury.' 96 Jamie Cassels' Dam-
ages for Lost Earning Capacity: Women and Children Last!a 97
contains the most extensive and sophisticated treatment of the issue.
Cassels takes as his problem the question of why women and female
children receive less than their male counterparts in damages assess-
ments. 98 He locates a major portion of the problem in the law's reli-
ance on the market:' 99
One important reason women receive lower awards is because of
the near exclusive reliance on the market as the measure of value
and loss. This reliance on the market gives rise to two problems.
190. See Cassels, supra note 33; Ken Cooper-Stephenson, Damages for Loss of
Working Capacity for Women, 43 Sask. L. Rev. 7 (1978-79); Gibson, supra note 130.
191. Cooper-Stephenson, supra note 190.
192. Id- at 14.
193. See supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
194. Cooper-Stephenson, supra note 190, at 14.
195. Id.
196. Cassels, supra note 33; Gibson, supra note 130.
197. Cassels, supra note 33.
198. Cassels examined a large sample of British Columbia decisions, both reported
and unreported, as well as illustrative cases from other jurisdictions. He concluded
that "despite some real advances, there is still a substantial downward bias in awards
to women." Id. at 446.
199. Id.
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First, it excludes, or at least depresses, the valuation of productive
activities carried on outside of the market and not rewarded by a
wage. The most prominent manifestation of this is the economic
invisibility of housework and the corresponding devaluation, or
non-valuation, of losses to homemakers. Second, reliance on the
market simply introduces into court the systemic inequalities faced
by women in the workforce. Even where a woman is, or is likely to
be, a wage earner, she is likely to earn far less than a man. By using
existing wage rates as the basis of assessment, personal injury
awards will thus reproduce the large wage differentials and gender
biases that occur in labour markets.2°°
Cassels' arguments are constructed to deal with the problem of gen-
der bias, although he observes that replicating the market in assessing
wage loss also tends to reproduce race and class distinctions. 20 1 His
primary quarrel with a market-based system is that it fails to value
certain kinds of work-most prominently uncompensated work in the
home-and assumes that current wage rates for all occupations are
free from gender bias.202 His critique is thoroughgoing, encompassing
many of the arguments made by comparable worth advocates and
feminists who seek a revaluation of traditional female endeavors, in-
cluding homework, child care and care of dependents. He also ex-
poses the courts for failing to take the conceptual approach to earning
capacity seriously, i.e., for measuring what female plaintiffs probably
would have earned, rather than what these plaintiffs could have
earned if they had not been injured.0 3
Cassels carefully catalogues and analyzes how Canadian courts have
engaged in practices that serve to depress damage awards for women,
including contingency deductions for marriage, 2 4 and the use of sex-
based tables to estimate wage loss, a practice he refers to as "statistical
discrimination. 20 5 Cassels concludes that there may be a fundamen-
tal problem with a system dedicated to individualized reconstruction
of plaintiff's lost opportunities:
What remains, then, is the issue of whether the law of damages
should seek to replicate with precision the results that would have
been achieved in an inegalitarian and unfair society. While there
may be good reasons to rely on market pricing in the allocation of
200. Id. at 446-47.
201. Id. at 485.
202. Id. at 446-47.
203. Id. at 448-49.
204. Id. at 454-58. Cassels also discusses what he terms the "remarriage contin-
gency deduction." In these cases, the court discounted the award to a female plaintiff
because of the possibility that she might remarry and share the benefit of her new
husband's earnings. Cassels points out that such a deduction is inconsistent with the
principle behind the award-to repair lost earning capacity. Even if plaintiff is mate-
rially better off because of a remarriage, this event in no way changes the fact that she
cannot earn money in the workplace because of her disability. Id. at 459-60.
205. Id. at 471-72.
[Vol. 63
TORT LITIGATION
resources in the market, should this system be extended in its en-
tirety to the way in which society provides care for the victims of
accidents? Why should the concern, care and respect to which an
injured person is entitled turn on a guess about how they would
have fared in the unfair lottery of life? These considerations indi-
cate that individualized measures of opportunity costs may not be
desirable. 206
Cassels' critique of the market leads him to suggest the radical solu-
tion of fashioning tort awards "with an eye to need."' Once individ-
ualized reconstruction is abandoned as a principle, tort awards could
be based on a "conventional sum representing some proportion of av-
erage provincial earnings of men and women." m  This change would,
of course, eliminate disparities based not only on race and gender, but
also on social class and educational levels. -09 As an alternative re-
formist proposal, Cassels suggests eliminating the marriage contin-
gency and rejecting gender-based and race-based earnings statistics. 210
His argument is based on equity, not actuarial soundness: "Race and
gender, while perhaps an accurate indicia of later income prospects,
should, as a matter of public policy, simply be rejected as
irrelevant." '211
In line with Cassels' approach, Elaine Gibson also has recently chal-
lenged the soundness of basing tort awards on the principle of restitu-
tio in integrum or restoring the individual victim to his or her previous
condition.212 Like Cassels, she is interested in exploring the possibility
of revamping the tort system more generally, substituting need, rather
than individualized restitution, as the basis of compensation.21 3
To a greater degree than Cassels, however, Gibson targets the use
of gender-based actuarial tables as evidence that the current system is
206. Id. at 485.
207. Id. at 489.
208. Id. at 485.
209. In support of his tentative recommendation, Cassels points out that:
Individualizing damage awards is speculative and expensive . . . [and] we
should at least question whether the results are worth the effort, especially
when the fairness of wage markets is questioned. Moreover, any liability
insurance system that focuses so heavily on individualized earnings capacity
is regressive. While the costs are borne equally by all, the compensation
benefits are distributed towards higher income (male) Canadians.
Id. at 489.
210. Id. at 489-90.
211. Id. at 490. Cassels is undecided, however, as to whether the Tucker approach
of using male statistics or the approach of using gender-neutral statistics is preferable.
Id
212. Gibson, supra note 130, at 190.
213. Gibson regards a needs-based approach as implementing the victim's perspec-
tive in tort law because it would "look at the situation the victim finds herself in as a
result of the injury." Id. at 210. Under such an approach, the "crystalline question
becomes how best to meet her needs for appropriate care resulting from the disabling
condition." Id.
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unfair. Gibson views use of such tables as both inaccurate and con-
trary to law. 14 She argues that tables constructed from an era when
women had fewer job opportunities are not a valid predictor of the
future, making their use "antiquated and deceptive. '215 Beyond advo-
cating an end to reliance on gender-based tables as a matter of public
policy, however, Gibson also contends that the practice violates Cana-
dian human rights statutes,2 1 6 as well as the Charter provision guaran-
teeing women's right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law
without discrimination based on sex.217 In this respect, Gibson's argu-
ment shares some of the same premises as the argument in this
Article.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE AGAINST RELIANCE ON GENDER-
BASED OR RACE-BASED DATA
The argument against the use of race-based and gender-based data
in this Article is narrower than the critiques of the Canadian commen-
tators. My focus on explicit classifications corresponds to the impor-
tance given those classifications in American constitutional law.218
Since at least 1976, when the Supreme Court decided the pivotal case
of Washington v. Davis,1 9 the Court has drawn a distinction between
lines drawn explicitly or intentionally upon sex and race and facially
neutral practices that have a disproportionate impact on racial or sex-
ual groups?2 0 Only the former will be scrutinized carefully by courts
and require a high level of justification. The more thoroughgoing cri-
tiques of the market advanced by the Canadian commentators,2 2 '
even if persuasive as a matter of policy, currently have little chance of
being accepted by American courts as a matter of constitutional law.
For this Article, I focus exclusively on practices that are constitution-
ally vulnerable.
214. Id. at 196-97.
215. Id. at 197.
216. Id. at 204.
217. Id. at 205-07.
218. My argument addresses federal constitutional challenges. David Jung sug-
gested to me that litigants might also object to the use of sex-based or race-based data
on state constitutional grounds, specifically as a violation of "remedies clauses" that
guarantee "open access to the courts" or "a remedy for every wrong." The theory
would be that certain classes of litigants (e.g., women, minority men) are being denied
full compensation for their injuries because of the social group to which they belong.
The state constitutional argument is plausible because remedies clauses have recently
been used with some success to attack statutory damage caps in medical malpractice
cases. See generally Jennifer Friesen, State Constitutional Law: Litigating Individual
Rights, Claims and Defenses 6-2 to 6-19 (1992).
219. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
220. See 426 U.S. at 245 (race discrimination); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 260 (1979) (gender discrimination).
221. See supra notes 190-217.
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A. State Action
The constitutional guarantee of equal protection, the provision
which supports the prohibition on race and sex discrimination, pro-
tects individuals only against governmental or state action.2m A find-
ing of sufficient state action is required, therefore, before any
constitutional challenge can be made to the use of race-based or gen-
der-based data in tort litigation.
One possible reason why the use of explicit race-based and gender-
based economic data has not yet become the subject of a constitu-
tional challenge in the United States may be a perceived lack of state
action. As noted earlier,223 the data are likely to be presented in the
form of expert testimony of an economist setting forth a projection of
the future earning capacity of the plaintiff.224 The economist will
often base the projections on government publications, which break
out the information in terms of gender and race (typically using racial
categories of black and white, or black, white and Hispanic).- The
economist is likely to prepare a report prior to trial and it is not un-
common for the economist to present alternative calculations, for ex-
ample, for different levels of educational attainment, or using gender-
based and alternatively gender-neutral or inclusive figures.' 2 An at-
torney wishing to challenge the expert's projections on constitutional
grounds would likely object to the admission of testimony or reports
using gender-based or race-based data. The court then would be
called upon to rule upon the objection and implicitly to decide
whether the plaintiff's race or gender ought to be regarded as a rele-
vant consideration in determining loss of future earning capacity.
The pivotal question then becomes whether admission of an ex-
pert's testimony based on race-based or gender-based statistics consti-
tutes sufficient state action to permit such a constitutional challenge.
My principal argument for finding state action is that it is impossible
to separate the use of the statistics from the underlying legal standard
in the case. When the court allows an expert to testify as to the plain-
tiff's future earning capacity, it makes a determination of relevancy
and an implicit judgment about the substance of the common law of
damages. The court's action authorizes the jury to base its decision on
222. See generally John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 452-
86 (4th ed. 1991); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 18, at 1688-1720
(2d ed. 1988).
223. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
224. The issue also could conceivably arise in a case in which no expert testimony
was introduced. For example, the attorney for the plaintiff might seek a jury instruc-
tion to the effect that the race or sex of the plaintiff is irrelevant to the determination
of damages. If the court refused to give such an instruction, it arguably would have
accepted the use of race and gender as a legally permissible factor in the calculation of
damages, even though no race-based or gender-based economic data was introduced.
225. O'Connor & Miller, supra note 38, at 356.
226. 1& at 356.
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the race or gender of the plaintiff, in effect establishing a common law
rule that the future earning capacity of a plaintiff depends upon the
plaintiff's gender and racial classification. 227 If such a standard were
explicitly embodied in a statute (e.g., "In determining the future earn-
ing capacity of a plaintiff who has no established record of earnings,
damages may be based on projections that take into account the plain-
tiff's race and gender"), the legislation would clearly constitute state
action. The outcome should not be different simply because the gov-
erning legal standard is a common law or nonstatutory standard. 28
The decision to admit race-based or gender-based projections is
closely connected to the judge's lawmaking role and is not equivalent,
for example, to permitting an eyewitness account of an accident to be
received into evidence. In the latter case, the judge can be neutral, in
the sense that admitting the testimony does not mean that the judge
believes the eyewitness or that the eyewitness perceives the event ac-
curately. By conceding the relevance of race-based or gender-based
data through its admission into evidence, however, the judge necessar-
ily leads the jury to believe that gender and race are legally permissi-
ble factors and thus cannot be said to be neutral on the issue.
The most recent state action precedents from the United States
Supreme Court support my argument in favor of state action. The
leading case, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,229 also involved the
interjection of a race-based classification during the course of a civil
trial. Edmonson held that the use of race-based peremptory chal-
lenges by a private litigant in a civil case is unconstitutional. 30
The technical framework the Edmonson majority employed to
guide its analysis of the state action question consisted of two general
inquiries: "first, whether the claimed constitutional deprivation re-
sulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in
state authority.., and second, whether the private party charged with
the deprivation could be described in all fairness as a state actor."' 1
The purpose of these two inquiries was to determine whether the
state's encouragement of a private activity is enough to justify treating
the private actor as acting with the authority of the government. Like
so many constitutional multi-factor tests, the state action framework is
227. My characterization of the court's endorsement of a common law rule of dam-
ages means that even in the rare case in which no expert testimony is presented, the
court's refusal to instruct the jury that race or gender is legally irrelevant to the deter-
mination of damages would constitute sufficient state action upon which to ground a
constitutional challenge.
228. See Tribe, supra note 222, § 18-6, at 1711 ("The general proposition that com-
mon law is state action-that is, that the state "acts" when its courts create and en-
force common law rules-is hardly controversial.").
229. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 620 (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939-42 (1982)).
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malleable and is capable of producing divergent results.232 The analy-
sis often amounts to an assessment of how closely the case at hand
resembles a case already decided by the Court.
In Edmonson, the Court had no difficulty finding that the exercise
of a peremptory challenge satisfied the first inquiry-that the right
clearly emanated from state law.233 Parties were permitted to exercise
peremptory challenges only because they were authorized to do so by
statute or decisional law and there were special rules or statutes that
governed the number and use of peremptories.3 Moreover, the use
of peremptories had no private analogue.3 5 The practice had no sig-
nificance outside a court of law.236
This inquiry is not so clearly satisfied in the case of admission of
expert testimony using race-based and gender-based statistics. Unlike
peremptory challenges, economic projections of future earning capac-
ity have a use outside the courtroom-in settlement negotiations and
in a wide variety of financial transactions in which it is useful to deter-
mine the likely earning power of a given individual. I would argue,
however, that the focus should be on the special function of economic
data in refining the legal standard for damages. With the question so
framed, a strong argument can be made that the admission of the ex-
pert's projection has its source in state authority.
Additionally, an argument could be made that state action occurs
when the opinion of an economist, admittedly a private actor, is trans-
formed into an expert opinion, sanctioned by the state at the moment
the trial judge certifies the witness as qualified. Very much like the
regulation of peremptory challenges, there are statutes and rules gov-
erning the use of experts, and permitting them to express opinions and
draw conclusions that other witnesses may not.23 7 The special status
of expert testimony has no parallel outside the courtroom. Although
the jury is rarely bound to accept the conclusions of an expert, expert
testimony carries unusual weight due to the trial judge's endorsement
of the expert as qualified in matters outside the common understand-
ing of the jurors. The transformation of the economist's projection
into expert testimony is accomplished through state authorization of
232. Laurence Tribe, for example, believes that the results in this area are so cha-
otic that he claims that the Supreme Court has not really developed a state action
doctrine, in the sense of "a set of rules for determining whether governmental or
private actors are to be deemed responsible for an asserted constitutional violation."
Tribe, supra note 222, § 18-1, at 1690. Peter Shane has argued that the results are
incoherent because the Court "has failed to elaborate a compelling normative vision
underlying the public/private distinction that (the state action] cases necessarily delin-
eate." Peter M. Shane, The Rust That Corrodes: State Action, Free Speed, and Re-
sponsibility, 52 La. L. Rev. 1585, 1586 (1992).
233. 500 U.S. at 620.
234. Id. at 620-21.
235. Id. at 620-22.
236. 1d. at 620.
237. See John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 13-15 (4th ed. 1992).
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courtroom procedures and direct involvement of the trial judge. Once
so treated, the testimony should no longer be regarded as private, sim-
ply because the state did not dictate the content of the testimony nor
pay the witness for the expenses incurred in connection with the
trial.z 8
The Court's second inquiry in Edmonson-whether the private ac-
tor can fairly be described as a state actor in this context-is acknowl-
edged by the Court to be an imprecise "factbound inquiry."' 9 Sorting
through the Court's voluminous precedent in this area, Edmonson
lists three factors as having general relevance: (1) "the extent to
which the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits;" (2)
"whether the actor is performing a traditional governmental func-
tion;" and (3) "whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique
way by the incidents of governmental authority. 240
In determining whether the private actor had the "overt, significant
assistance" 241 of a state official (the first Edmonson factor listed
above), the Court emphasized that the state was responsible for ad-
ministering the jury system-from summoning the jurors, to control-
ling voir dire, to enforcing the peremptory challenge.242 Particularly
significant for the Court was the moment that the trial judge enforced
a discriminatory peremptory challenge, making the court not only "a
party to the [biased act]," but also placing "its power, property and
prestige behind the [alleged] discrimination. 2 43
This reasoning would seem to apply without much modification to
the admission of expert testimony premised on race-based or gender-
based statistics. The state creates the evidentiary rules, including the
rules governing expert witnesses. At the moment when the court
rules to admit the expert's economic projection over an objection, it
tells the jury that race or sex is a legally permissible criterion in deter-
mining the amount of the damage award. In a nonsubtle way, this
amounts to state assistance of private discrimination. Moreover, be-
cause the jury may well witness the exchange between the objecting
counsel and the court when admission of expert testimony is chal-
lenged, this could be argued to present a stronger case than Edmon-
son for a finding of state action. If the Court was willing to consider
the trial judge a participant in discriminatory action simply by enforc-
ing a peremptory challenge that is exercised without stating a reason
and without any discussion by counsel, the same reasoning should ap-
238. In the case of court-appointed experts, of course, the state involvement would
appear to be even greater.
239. 500 U.S. at 621.
240. Id. at 621-22.
241. Id. at 622.
242. Id. at 623-24.
243. Id. at 624 (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725
(1961)).
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ply with greater force when the court overrules an objection specifi-
cally challenging an expert's testimony as discriminatory.
The second factor of whether the private party was involved in a
"traditional governmental function" was easily fulfilled in Edmonson.
The Court first characterized the jury as "a quintessential governmen-
tal body, having no attributes of a private actor"'-" and then conceptu-
alized jury selection, including the use of peremptory challenges, as
the selection of state officials.245 The Edmonson Court also stressed
the pivotal fact-finding role of the jury, whose verdict is ultimately
incorporated in a judgment enforceable by the court. 46
Initially, it might not seem that an expert witness appearing at the
request of a party to a private litigation is performing a traditional
government function. As only one witness in the trial, the expert's
role is not as crucial as that of the jury and the expert is not being paid
by the state.247 The Edmonson Court, however, did not ask whether
the jury members ought to be regarded as state actors, but whether
private counsel's discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge was
state action.'-" As the Court framed the question, the focal point was
whether counsel's role in determining "representation on a govern-
mental body" constituted state action.249
Along similar lines, I would argue that the focus should be on
whether judicial admission of discriminatory expert testimony consti-
tutes state action. The Edmonson Court regarded the exercise of a
peremptory challenge as state action because its objective was to de-
termine representation on a governmental body, even though the mo-
tive behind the challenge was to protect a private interest 50
Similarly, although the parties to a tort action have private interests at
stake, the objective of expert testimony is to help the jury apply the
law to the facts, a process that is intricately connected to choice of the
governing legal standard. I would argue that the court's acceptance of
an expert's use of race-based or gender-based data is inseparable from
its determination of substantive law and as such is appropriately
viewed as a traditional governmental function."5
244. Id
245. Id. at 626.
246. Id at 624-25.
247. It is clear that compensation by the state does not by itself transform an actor
into a state actor. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981), held that a public
defender was not a state actor in his or her representation of a criminal defendant.
The Court focused on the purpose and function of the representation, which was ad-
versarial to the state, rather than on the source of the compensation.
248. 500 U.S. at 620.
249. Id. at 626.
250. Id.
251. For a similar analysis of the state action issue in the context of judicial en-
dorsement of racial generalizations to support a claim of self defense, see Jody D.
Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Invol-
untary Negrophobes, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 781, 808 (1994).
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Finally, the Edmonson third factor-whether the injury is aggra-
vated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority-is
satisfied in the case of admission of discriminatory economic projec-
tions as fully as it was in Edmonson. A clear message of Edmonson is
that discrimination which takes place in the courtroom produces a
special injury attributable to the state.
Few places are a more real expression of the constitutional author-
ity of the government than a courtroom, where the law itself un-
folds. Within the courtroom, the government invokes its laws to
determine the rights of those who stand before it. In full view of the
public, litigants press their cases, witnesses give testimony, juries
render verdicts, and judges act with the utmost care to ensure that
justice is done .... Racial discrimination has no place in the court-
room, whether the proceeding is civil or criminal. 52
Particularly when the challenge is one of race discrimination, the
Court has been inclined to be more liberal in finding state action.253
Justice Scalia described the Court's posture as one of "uncompromis-
ing hostility to race-based judgments, even by private actors!"254 If
Scalia is correct, race-based (and presumably also gender-based) eco-
nomic projections admitted as evidence in a civil trial should qualify as
state action.
It is possible, of course, to construct an argument distinguishing Ed-
monson. The case against a finding of state action would emphasize
the private status of the expert and de-emphasize the role of the trial
judge in qualifying the witness and admitting the testimony. An oppo-
nent of state action would argue that juries are fully aware that ex-
perts are paid witnesses for a particular party and, if necessary, can be
instructed that the substance of the expert testimony does not repre-
sent the views of the court or the dictates of the law. Echoing Justice
O'Connor's dissent in Edmonson, this strategy would paint the civil
trial as a "stage on which private parties may act," and for which the
government is not responsible for every discriminatory private act
"that occurs upon it. ' 2 55
Beyond formal attempts to distinguish Edmonson, the case against
finding state action could also be made on prudential grounds. De-
spite the forceful and general language of the Court, the practice con-
demned in Edmonson was a narrow one and required only that the
courts extend the procedures developed in the criminal context to civil
252. 500 U.S. at 627.
253. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that judicial enforce-
ment of privately negotiated, racially restrictive covenants constitutes state action);
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (holding that racial discrimi-
nation by restaurant operated on public property constitutes state action); Norwood
v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (holding that state aid to students who attended
racially discriminatory private school constitutes state action).
254. 500 U.S. at 630 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 628 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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cases.2- 6 Arguably, the requirement that trial courts monitor the sta-
tistical foundation of expert opinions is unfamiliar and may seem on-
erous. Once the merits are reached, the constitutional questions may
not always be easily resolved. It is possible that in some contexts even
racial categorization is constitutionally permissible, provided that the
data are necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.
For example, statistical data on the incidence of a particular disease
among racial groups might be necessary to show whether a physician
treated a patient with reasonable care. As a practical matter, courts
might be reluctant to find state action because they do not want to
confront novel questions of whether common empirical methodolo-
gies that utilize race and gender can be used properly in the
courtroom.
On both formal and prudential grounds, however, I believe the case
for finding state action is strong. The admission of race-based and
gender-based expert testimony is much more likely to affect the out-
come of a case than racial bias in jury selection. The court's admission
of arguably biased expert testimony has more than symbolic value; it
inscribes a rule of decision that systematically undervalues the poten-
tial of women and minorities. The formal requirement of "fair attri-
bution" of the private action to the state is met because the amount of
damages awarded by a state court judgment can be attributed fairly to
the expert's projection. To meet the prudential concern, I would ar-
gue that the distinction between explicit and de facto classifications
necessarily circumscribes the court's scrutiny. Courts will not be
asked to determine the motivations of expert witnesses, nor to deter-
mine whether the methodology employed has a disparate impact on
protected groups. The inquiry is confined to two components:
whether racial or sexual classifications have been used (a question
about which the experts themselves can readily answer), and the less
obvious, but nevertheless manageable, question of whether use of
such classifications is constitutionally justified.
B. Race-Based Discrimination
If the merits of the constitutional challenge are reached, the use of
explicitly race-based data is very likely to be prohibited. Perhaps no
principle of constitutional law is more firmly entrenchdd than the anti-
discrimination principle as applied to explicit racial classifications.
Expressed doctrinally, the anti-discrimination principle holds that ra-
256. ld. at 628. Before Edmonson was decided, the Court had already prohibited
racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by prosecutors in criminal trials.
Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Sub-
sequent to Edmonson, the Court ruled that criminal defense attorneys could not use
their peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. Georgia v. McCol-
lum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
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cial classifications are inherently suspect and can only be justified in
the most compelling of circumstances."
The Supreme Court has not upheld a racial classification that disad-
vantages a minority group since it first announced the suspect classifi-
cation/compelling interest test in Korematsu v. United States258 in
1944. Classifications that are race-dependent but purport to treat ra-
cial groups equally have fared no better, as exemplified by the Court's
rejection of anti-miscegenation laws 59 and state sponsored racial seg-
regation.260 In their hornbook, John Nowak and Ronald Rotunda
venture that the chances of a racial classification being upheld are ex-
ceedingly slim:
It is not possible to anticipate every possible argument the govern-
ment may make to justify such classifications, but the Court's re-
fusal (since the World War II Japanese internment cases) to uphold
any racial classification which burdens minority members or ap-
pears to have a stigmatizing effect would lead one to believe that
few governmental interests, other than a possible interest in protec-
tion of human life, could justify any use of such classifications.261
The now-familiar rationales for this strong distrust of racial classifi-
cations have been extensively articulated in the scholarship, from both
individualist and group-based perspectives. Commentators have per-
suasively argued that explicit racial classifications are likely to emerge
from a biased process,262 reflecting either racial antagonism, "assump-
tions of the differential worth of racial groups," or "racially selective
sympathy and indifference." '263 Racial classifications also produce
harmful results, stigmatizing minorities as inferior and inflicting cumu-
lative burdens on those groups in society who are subjected to perva-
sive patterns of discrimination. Even when racial generalizations are
statistically accurate or rational, they can harm atypical members of
the racial group for whom the generalization is inaccurate. From a
group-based or anti-subordination perspective, racial classifications
burdening minority groups are considered invidious because they
deepen power disparities among social groups and make it less likely
that systemic discrimination will be dismantled in the future.264
257. See generally, Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 222, at 605-06; Tribe, supra note
222, at 1451-54.
258. 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944).
259. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
260. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
261. Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 222, at 630 n.119.
262. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 145-48
(1980).
263. Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 Harv.
L. Rev. 1, 7 (1976).
264. See Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protec-
tion, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1003, 1007-10 (1986).
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The distrust of racial classifications also may reflect a desire to dis-
associate the law from an odious history of using racial classification
to enforce white supremacy. In a multi-racial society, such as the
United States, people do not fall naturally into discrete racial group-
ings. Legal definitions of "white" or "black" have been used coer-
cively to maintain a bright line between the two groups where, in
reality, such a line does not exist. In many Southern states, for exam-
ple, persons were classified as "black" if any of their remote ancestors
were African-American.265 Under such a rigid scheme, there is little
room for mixed-race or multi-racial lineage; race tends to be con-
structed as a dichotomous concept2 66 Additionally, in the United
States, legal discourse has often treated "whites" and "blacks" as the
only racial groups, marginalizing other minority groups such as Mexi-
can-Americans, Native-Americans and Asian-Americans. Legal clas-
sifications of race tend to be unrefined and often reflect ignorance of
differences within a given category (e.g., Hispanic is an umbrella term
that includes such distinct groups as Cuban-Americans, Mexican-
Americans, Puerto Ricans and persons with European heritage who
have a Spanish surname).267 The problems that come with imposing
racial classifications upon persons can sometimes be avoided or miti-
gated by allowing persons to self-identify and accepting their state-
ment of racial identity. In adversarial contexts, such as personal injury
litigation, however, opponents are likely to contest a plaintiff's state-
ment of racial identity whenever another plausible classification
would serve to reduce the amount of recovery.
The use of race-based data to estimate the future earning capacity
of an individual does not warrant creating an exception to the near-
absolute ban on racial classifications. The argument for using race-
based tables is likely to center on the need for accuracy: the claim
would be that if there is no reliable individual record of earnings, sta-
tistical data are necessary to make a reliable projection and that race-
based data provide a more refined statistical measure than integrated
data. Race, under this argument, functions as a good proxy for earn-
265. For discussions of the historical system of racial classification used in the
United States, see Julie C. Lythcott-Haims, Where Do Mixed Babies Belong? Racial
Classification in America and Its Implications for Transracial Adoption, 29 Harv. C.R-
C.L. L. Rev. 531, 533-37 (1994); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is
Color-Blind", 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 23-36 (1991); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property,
106 Harv. L. Rev. 1709, 1737-41 (1993).
266. See generally Elizabeth Martinez, Beyond Black/White: The Racisms of Our
7me, 20 Soc. Just. 22 (1993) (critiquing the traditional black-white framework in
American society). Recently, however, there have been calls for recognition of the
multi-racial lineage of many Americans. The federal government is considering ad-
ding a new multi-racial category in the census to be conducted in 2000. See Lythcott-
Haims, supra note 265, at 543-48; Ruth Colker, Bi" Race, Sexual Orientation, Gender,
and Disability, 55 Ohio St. L.J. (forthcoming Oct. 1994).
267. See Nicholas Lemann, The Other Underclass: Puerto Ricans in the United
States, The Atlantic, Dec. 1991, at 96.
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ing potential because race continues to be an important social dimen-
sion in American life, particularly in the workplace. A proponent of
the use of race-based tables would also likely assert that an econo-
mist's use of race-based data is "neutral" in the sense that the econo-
mist is only trying to measure what "is" the reality for all racial
groups, not what the reality "ought to be."
The accuracy/neutrality justification for the use of race-based data
will not withstand strict scrutiny. Even assuming for the moment that
using race-based data could be shown to produce the most accurate
individualized prediction of future earning capacity, the Supreme
Court would probably not regard the argument as sufficient to justify
government use of race-based statistics. The most damning precedent
is Palmore v. Sidoti,2 68 holding that the government may not "neu-
trally" reflect private prejudice.2 69 The case involved the removal of a
child from the custody of her mother, a white woman, upon her re-
marriage to an African-American man.2 70 The state courts were con-
vinced that the change in custody was in the best interests of the child
to avoid the stigma and harassment the child might suffer from peers
when they discovered her stepfather was not white.27 '
A unanimous Court in Palmore held that it was improper for the
state courts to consider the race of the stepparent, despite the impor-
tance of the government's objective. 72 It did not suffice that race was
relevant to predicting the difficulties the child would face.2 73 The
Court stated that:
It would ignore reality to suggest that racial and ethnic prejudices
do not exist .... There is a risk that a child living with a stepparent
of a different race may be subject to a variety of pressures and
stresses not present if the child were living with parents of the same
racial or ethnic origin.
The question, however, is whether the reality of private biases
and the possible injury they might inflict are permissible considera-
tions for removal of an infant child from the custody of its natural
mother. We have little difficulty concluding that they are not. The
Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it toler-
ate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but
the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.
274
Palmore would seem to preclude the contention that reliance on
race-based data is nondiscriminatory because it merely reflects the re-
268. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 430.
271. Id. at 431.
272. Id. at 434.
273. Id. at 433.
274. Id. at 433 (footnote omitted).
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ality of a racially stratified workplace."75 Instead the government is
required by the reasoning of Palmore to attempt to break the cycle of
discrimination by refusing to accept racial disparities as a fact of life
that must be reinscribed in legal standards. To the extent that Pal-
more insists that the government refrain from using racial categories,
even when they function as good proxies for other legitimate vari-
ables, the objective of accuracy is subordinated to the goal of racial
equity. Particularly once it is acknowledged that estimating future
earning capacity of injured children is already an imprecise process,
this seems an easier case than Palmore.
Moreover, it is far from clear that reliance on race-based data gen-
erates the most accurate estimation of future earning capacity. As the
Canadian commentators have argued with respect to gender z76 the
approach is static in that it assumes that earnings disparities by race
will continue into the future.21 The assumption may underestimate
the impact that anti-racist public initiatives might have in changing
employment patterns, an impact that might gain momentum if racial
equality were treated seriously in the law as an attainable goal. It
seems anomalous for courts to profess a commitment to racial equal-
ity and equal protection on the one hand, and at the same time to bet
against equality by endorsing race-based earnings projections. Re-
quiring tort damages to be awarded on a race-neutral basis puts force
and faith behind the anti-discrimination principle (the legal equivalent
of "putting your money where your mouth is").
Looked at from an individualistic perspective, the use of race-based
data unfairly ties an individual to the track record of his or her racial
group. For example, the minority plaintiff may well dispute the accu-
racy of using race-based worklife expectancy tables that incorporate
the fact that a disproportionate number of African-American men
lose working years while in jail or have their lives shortened because
of higher exposure to violence. The Constitution should prohibit the
state from requiring that an African-American man prove that he
would have escaped the race-correlated risks of incarceration or an
early death in order to boost his worklife expectancy. Equal protec-
tion means that individuals seeking legal redress for damages should
not be hindered by race-based presumptions about their individual
potential or their life prospects.
Finally, the case law provides no persuasive basis for carving out a
new exception for the use of race-based data in tort litigation. The
Supreme Court generally has been unreceptive to states' claims for
the necessity to compile and maintain race-based information, except
275. Cf. Armour, supra note 251, at 793-96 (arguing that it is unconstitutional to
employ race-based generalizations regarding crimes committed by African-Americans
to establish claim of self-defense).
276. See Gibson, supra note 130, at 197; Cooper-Stephenson, supra note 190, at 14.
277. Cooper-Stephenson, supra note 190, at 14.
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when done only for statistical purposes, that is, for the limited purpose
of allowing states to discern the racial impact of their practices.278
Thus in 1964, the Court held that a state could not require that a can-
didate's race be designated on nomination papers and ballots,279 and
summarily affirmed the invalidation of a state provision requiring sep-
arate lists of blacks and whites in voting, tax and property records. 280
According to the Court, presenting racial information, despite its
facially neutral application to blacks and whites, was unconstitutional
because it directed "the citizen's attention to the single consideration
of race or color."'" The Court was concerned that when the state
compiled racial information, there was a danger of "casually
promot[ing] a distinction in the treatment of persons solely on the ba-
sis of their color."282 In only one instance-an aspect of the Court's
summary affirmance in Tancil v. Woolls283 -was a state permitted to
require recitation of the race of the spouses in divorce decrees.284
That instance had been distinguished by the lower court because the
divorce data in Tancil would be used only for statistical and identifica-
tion purposes and would not stimulate others to act upon it.285 Be-
cause the racial information presented through expert economic
witnesses is intended to be used to calculate damages, the Tancil ex-
ception for statistical purposes is inapplicable.
The racial information cases establish that the government may
compile non-individualized racial data to monitor economic and social
trends.28 6 These cases, however, reinforce the argument that racial
data cannot constitutionally be relied upon to value the injury of a
plaintiff in a tort action.
278. See Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 222, at 630 ("Although racial considera-
tions may not be used to burden members of minority races, the government appears
to have some right to know the racial impact of its actions. Thus, it would appear that
the government can compile racial information so long as it not used to burden any-
one because of his race.").
279. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 403-04 (1964).
280. Hamm v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156, 158 (E.D. Va. 1964),
aff'd per curiam sub. nom. Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964).
281. 375 U.S. at 402.
282. 230 F. Supp. at 157.
283. 379 U.S. 19 (1964).
284. Id.
285. The district court stated that:
[Tihe designation of race, just as sex or religious denomination, may in cer-
tain records serve a useful purpose, and the procurement and compilation of
such information by State authorities cannot be outlawed per se. For exam-
ple, the securing and chronicling of racial data for identification or statistical
use violates no constitutional privilege.
230 F. Supp. at 158.
286. It is more debatable whether the government may compile and act upon race-
based data as part of an affirmative action program. For the view that such affirma-
tive action use is permissible, provided there is little chance of abuse or demeaning
demands, see Tribe, supra note 222, § 16, at 1481-82 n.9.
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C. Gender-Based Discrimination
As a conceptual matter, I would argue that the use of sex-based and
race-based data are indistinguishable because each case poses the
same problem of unfairness to individuals through state reinforcement
of private discrimination. For this reason, the arguments made against
the use of race-based data above can be used to challenge gender clas-
sifications as well. Because the constitutional standard for reviewing
gender classifications differs from the strict scrutiny applied to racial
classifications, however, it is necessary to construct a separate case
against gender-based data.
After a short period of instability in the early 1970s, the Supreme
Court settled upon an intermediate level of scrutiny to evaluate the
constitutionality of gender classifications. Craig v. Boren,' sI decided
in 1976, is most often cited for the governing standard, expressed as
whether classifications by gender serve important governmental inter-
ests and are substantially related to the achievement of those inter-
ests.' At its most superficial level, the difference between strict and
intermediate scrutiny is that while classifications virtually never pass
strict scrutiny, they more often survive the less demanding intermedi-
ate scrutiny. Some explicit gender classifications have been upheld by
the Supreme Court." 9
The precedents indicate that the Court is hostile to gender classifi-
cations premised on traditional sex-role assumptions that tend to rein-
force women's domestic and maternal roles as wives and mothers, and
downplay women's roles as workers and independent economic ac-
tors.2 9° Thus, the Court has struck down a number of schemes that
presumed wives to be economically dependent on their husbands and
conditioned financial benefits on the sex of the spouse. 91 The Court
refused to allow sex to be used as a proxy for dependency, despite the
strong statistical evidence that most wives were, in fact, financially de-
287. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
288. Id. at 197.
289. The Supreme Court has occasionally upheld noncompensatory gender classifi-
cations. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding male-only draft
registration policy); Michael M. v. Superior Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding gen-
der-based statutory rape law); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (permitting
restrictions on unmarried fathers' rights to sue for the wrongful death of their biologi-
cal children); see also Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (upholding favorable
computation of women's earnings for Social Security benefits to compensate for past
discrimination).
290. Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts,
and Feminism, 7 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 175, 178-79 (1982) (describing how the
Supreme Court, beginning in the 1970s, invalidated classifications premised on the
"breadwinner-homemaker, master-dependent dichotomy").
291. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (rejecting requirement that wid-
owers prove dependency to collect Social Security survivor benefits); Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (rejecting restriction of "motheres" survivor benefits
to surviving wives); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (rejecting require-
ment that spouses of female soldiers prove dependency).
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pendent on their husbands. The Court's distaste for gender stereotyp-
ing in equal protection cases can best be described not only as a
concern for overbroad generalizations, but also as providing legal sup-
port for women in nontraditional roles (and conversely, for men in
traditionally female arenas). Laurence Tribe sums up the line of sex
discrimination cases in the 1970s in this way:
It is clear that the laws invalidated in these cases, from Reed292 to
Caban,2 93 shared an important characteristic in terms of impact on
behavior: All either prevented, or economically discouraged, de-
partures from "traditional" sex roles, freezing biology into social
destiny. The government's almost uniform argument in justification
of these laws emphasized the economy achieved by the accurate and
therefore "rational" assumption of traditional male and female in-
clinations and capacities. The Supreme Court's thoughtful response
to this argument has recognized the argument's essence as self-ful-
filling prophecy: The "accuracy" of the government's assumption is
derived in some significant degree from the chill on sex-role experi-
mentation and change generated by the classifications
themselves.294
The Court's approach advances an individualistic philosophy inso-
far as it frees nonconformist women from government-imposed struc-
tures that make it harder for them to compete in the workplace and
public sphere. From a group perspective, the Court's disapproval of
gender classifications also can be seen as weakening the system of
gender subordination by prohibiting paternalistic or protectionist ar-
guments from becoming excuses for segregating women into lower
paying, lower prestige jobs and occupations.
The one respect in which the Court's sex-based discrimination doc-
trine is less exacting than its approach with respect to race classifica-
tions has been its treatment of classifications arguably premised on
biological differences between men and women.295 For these purport-
edly real differences, some members of the Court have regarded the
sexes as not similarly situated and have reasoned that different treat-
ment does not violate the core requirement of equal treatment: that
likes be treated alike. The most dramatic example of this reasoning is
the Court's refusal to regard discrimination based on pregnancy as ex-
plicit sex discrimination.296 Legislative classifications implicating is-
sues of sexuality297 and parental rights to young children 298 are the
292. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
293. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
294. Tribe, supra note 222, §§ 16-26, at 1565 (footnotes omitted).
295. See generally Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the
Supreme Court, 92 Yale L.J. 913, 931-49 (1983) (critiquing "real differences" approach
of Justices Rehnquist and Stewart).
296. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974).
297. Michael M. v. Superior Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding gender-based stat-
utory rape law); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (upholding exclusion of
women prison guards from prison populated by sex offenders).
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most likely candidates for this more relaxed scrutiny. In this type of
case, the Court may not question whether the assumption made about
women as a group invariably holds true for individual women or
whether it poses a threat of reinforcing traditional attitudes. The di-
chotomy the Court seems to have drawn between sex (biological or
natural differences) and gender (socially constructed differences) has
no analogue in the contemporary race cases which assume that all dif-
ferences among races are culturally or socially based.
The Court's more lenient stance toward classifications based on
"real" differences, however, has no bearing on the question of the
propriety of the use of gender-based statistics to predict future earn-
ing capacity. Because the difference between men's and women's
earning capacity cannot be traced to biology, it is not a real difference
in the Court's lexicon. The most plausible argument that can be made
in this context is that women's greater commitment to child rearing
accounts for part of the pay gap. The Court, however, has consistently
refused to accept women's traditional maternal role as the type of real
difference that might justify a gender classification.299 In fact, a prom-
inent feature of the line of cases since Reed is the Court's rejection of
old precedents that tended to regard "women" as synonymous with
"wives and mothers" and to map onto all women the conventional
wisdom about maternal and wifely behavior.3" The use of gender-
based statistics to project future earning capacity most closely resem-
bles the economic dependency presumptions invalidated by the Court
in the 1970s. In each situation, the gender-based classification is a
generalization based upon women's historical lack of earning power
compared to that of men and represents an attempt to bind individual
women to the experience of the gender group. The Court's reluctance
to uphold classifications which might disadvantage women in their
nontraditional role as wage earners should carry over to the use of
sex-based earnings projections.
There is some possibility, however, that the Court might extend its
lenient approach to permit statistical discrimination in cases in which
an individualized determination is not only costly but impossible. Ad-
298. In cases involving unmarried parents, the Court has afforded greater rights to
mothers than to fathers. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), held that a biologi-
cal father could be denied the right to block the adoption of a two-year-old daughter
because he had never established a relationship with the child.
299. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (holding that surviving
fathers, as well as mothers, are entitled to benefits to care for dependent children);
Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (holding that state cannot
require only surviving husbands to prove economic dependence to qualify for work-
ers' compensation).
300. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding exemption of women
from jury duty unless they volunteer); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (per-
mitting prohibition of licenses to women as bartenders unless owner was applicant's
husband or father); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding protective labor
legislation for women only).
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vocates of actuarial schemes would point out that gender-based tables
are used only when there is insufficient information to make an indi-
vidualized projection. Unlike some cases decided by the Court in
which an individualized determination is the obvious alternative to
use of gender-based classification, 30 1 invalidation of gender-based
data would require experts to resort to inclusive, gender-neutral statis-
tics which would arguably still not serve the goal of treating the plain-
tiff like an individual.
The argument for treating gender-based actuarial data as an excep-
tion to the rule disfavoring gender-based classifications, however, has
already been debated and rejected by the Court in cases decided
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The clearest state-
ment of the Court's reasoning is found in Los Angeles Department of
Water & Power v. Manhart,3° holding that an employer could not re-
quire women to make larger contributions to a pension fund because
women as a group lived longer than men.3"3 The Court interpreted
Title VII as mandating an individualized focus and refused to approve
the gender-based actuarial approach simply because it was common
practice in the industry.3" In this context, the Court could see no
relevant distinction between race and gender classifications. 30 5 Writ-
ing for the majority, Justice Stevens drew the analogy to race, and
consequently ruled that the classification could not stand:3 6
Actuarial studies could unquestionably identify differences in life
expectancy based on race or national origin, as well as sex. But a
statute which was designed to make race irrelevant in the employ-
ment market ... could not reasonably be construed to permit a
take-home-pay differential based on a racial classification.
Even if the statutory language were less clear, the basic policy of
the statute requires that we focus on fairness to individuals rather
than fairness to classes. Practices that classify employees in terms of
religion, race, or sex tend to preserve traditional assumptions about
groups rather than thoughtful scrutiny of individuals. The general-
ization involved in this case illustrates the point. Separate mortality
tables are easily interpreted as reflecting innate differences between
the sexes; but a significant part of the longevity differential may be
explained by the social fact that men are heavier smokers than
women.
30 7
Additionally, the Court refused to create an exception for actuarial
data; even if sound from the standpoint of actuarial practice, the use
301. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (alimony determinations); Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (determination of administrator of estate).
302. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
303. Id. at 711.
304. Id. at 710.
305. Id. at 709.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 709-10.
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of explicit gender-based data was treated as discriminatory.- S Justice
Stevens was not swayed by the argument that insurance presented a
different case because individualized determinations were impossible:
It is true that insurance is concerned with events that are individu-
ally unpredictable, but that is characteristic of many employment
decisions. Individual risks, like individual performance, may not be
predicted by resort to classifications proscribed by Title VII.3°
If Manhart had been decided under the equal protection clause,
rather than under Title VII, there would be little question that its rea-
soning discredits the use of gender-based projections in civil suits. If
anything, Manhart presents the harder case: the difference in longev-
ity between the sexes can plausibly be regarded as a biological differ-
ence, while the wage gap is clearly social in origin. The Court's
insistence on an individualized focus in Manhart underscores its com-
mitment to equalizing women's position in the workplace. The result
in Manhart signals that women workers have a right to the same finan-
cial security in retirement as is accorded to male workers. That wo-
men live longer means that equal security may cost more for women
as a group. If the goal, however, is to assure that all workers are pro-
tected from poverty for the remainder of their lives after retirement,
the "subsidy" provided by men does not appear unjust.310 Only if
men's needs are used as the standard for all workers, does women's
greater longevity appear to justify affording them less financial secur-
ity after they retire.
The one remaining question is whether the Manhart approach
should be applied to the constitutional context where it will reach be-
yond employment practices, with no possibility of a congressional
change in policy. To answer this, there is no need to address the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of all gender-based actuarial or insurance
practices. 311 A strong case can, nevertheless, be made that the two
308. Id. at 709-11.
309. Id. at 710.
310. One helpful framing of the issue in Manhart appears in the notes to a recent
employment discrimination casebook where the editors ask if Manhart might be "ex-
plained by the view that true equality for female workers requires the removal of any
extra burden imposed by the greater average longevity of their sex?" Samuel Es-
treicher & Michael C. Harper, Cases and Materials on the Law Governing the Em-
ployment Relationship 286 (2d ed. 1992).
311. The use of gender-based mortality tables was upheld against a constitutional
challenge in Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. United States, 775 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1095 (1986). That case, however, dealt with the IRS's
valuation of a reversionary interest in a decedent's estate. ld. The Court distinguished
the IRS practice from the typical gender discrimination suit because the IRS practice
resulted in a "patchwork distribution of relative advantages and disadvantages" to
women directly affected by the practice. Id. at 466. The IRS nevertheless changed its
practice in 1983 to use unisex tables. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(0 (as amended by T.D.
7955, 1984-1 C.B. 40). See also Estate of Darrin v. Taxation Div. Director, 9 NJ. Tax
419, 435 (NJ. Tax Ct. 1987) (use of gender-specific life expectancy tables for valuation
of life estate violates equal protection).
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specific practices challenged in this Article-gender-based projections
of worklife expectancies and gender-based wage projections-so
closely resemble those sex-based classifications already held unconsti-
tutional that no exceptional treatment is warranted. The use of gen-
der-based projections are premised upon highly contested cultural
assumptions. Imbedded in the projections of shorter worklife expec-
tancy for women is the presumption that all women will interrupt their
careers for a substantial period of time for the purpose of child-rear-
ing. The lower sex-based earnings projections presume that women's
inferior status in the workplace will continue. Manhart's concern for
individualized equity is also a strong theme in constitutional jurispru-
dence, at least when the practice is not one directly implicating sexual-
ity or biology. When the underlying assumption is not only that there
is a difference in longevity between the sexes, but that sex-differenti-
ated cultural patterns will persist, the constitutional precedents pro-
vide no support for more lenient treatment of gender-based statistical
practices. As in Manhart, the racial analogy holds and justifies invali-
dation of sex-based as well as race-based projections.
D. Remedying the Constitutional Violation: Mandating Use of
Inclusive Statistics
The remedy most often prescribed for the unconstitutional use of
prohibited classifications is to require the substitution of gender-neu-
tral or race-neutral categories. In practice, this would seem to require
that expert witnesses rely only upon inclusive statistics-not refined
according to gender and race-to project future earning capacity. The
Canadian solution of selecting the highest earning group, i.e., white
men, as a measure of the fair level of earnings for all persons, does not
fit well with United States constitutional notions of equality. In con-
trast to the approach of statutory schemes, such as the Equal Pay
Act,312 the equal protection clause has not been interpreted to require
that the disadvantaged group be raised to the standard of white men.
The mandate is solely one of equality, even if the effect of equalizing
the standard means worse treatment for some groups.313 In the case
of economic projections, as discussed above,314 because the gender
gap in earnings is the most pronounced, women of all races stand to
gain the most from equalization. White men will be the biggest losers,
with minority men faring somewhat worse than at present.
312. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994). The Equal Pay Act makes it unlawful for employers to
reduce the pay of any employee in order to comply with the Act. 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(a)(3). The employer's only option is to raise the pay of women to the male rate.
313. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 16 (1975) (state is free to remedy equal protec-
tion violation either by extending favorable treatment or expanding unfavorable
treatment).
314. See discussion supra notes 69-98 and accompanying text.
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An argument perhaps could be made that if white male statistics
were adopted as the uniform measure in all cases, the measure would
lose its gender-specific and race-specific nature and could be used
without violating the equal protection clause. This argument is prob-
lematic, however, because it implicitly adopts the experience of white
men as the standard by which to measure all persons' treatment. In
this world view, only white men have been treated fairly, with others
suffering disadvantage. Missing from this account, however, is a per-
suasive argument for conceptualizing the situation of white men as
constituting fair treatment, as opposed to privileged treatment.
The argument for equalization does not take the experience of
white men as the standard, but presupposes that some groups have
been privileged and some groups have been disadvantaged. It also
recognizes that some groups-notably, white women and minority
men-are simultaneously privileged and disadvantaged. White wo-
men retain their race privilege, even though their gender is a disad-
vantage; minority men benefit from being in the dominant gender
group, but suffer from race discrimination. The statistical norm that
equalization requires by mandating the use of inclusive statistics is
facially gender and race neutral. It goes beyond superficial neutrality,
moreover, because it takes the experience of all persons into account
in setting the norm. In this process, traditionally disadvantaged
groups are not singled out as different, as the only groups requiring
attention. Instead, the earning capacity of all persons is subject to re-
view. Even if fewer dollars in damages are awarded overall than in
the Canadian solution, it strikes me as a preferable solution. In this
context, the dismantling of gender and race classifications means not
only lifting burdens, but destroying privilege.
V. POSTSCRIPT
Racist and sexist practices stem from deep-seated cultural assump-
tions and have an infuriating capacity to take on new forms, to change
with the times, without doing much damage to the status quo. Using
gender-based and race-based economic data to determine the earning
capacity of tort victims is one contemporary mechanism by which the
lives of women and racial minorities are devalued, while still preserv-
ing the appearance of neutrality and rationality. I doubt whether
most defense attorneys would openly argue today that women have
less economic value than men because women are domestic creatures
whose labor is not worthy of compensation or capable of being evalu-
ated in dollars. Nor would it be likely that an expert witness would
defend a low estimate of lost earning capacity of an African-American
child by stating that such a child cannot expect to achieve what a white
child would in this racially stratified society. Instead, lowered estima-
tions of the potential of women and racial minorities are disguised by
relying on statistics, without questioning the legitimacy of this use of
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gender-based and race-based classifications. My argument against the
use of such economic data is straightforward and consistent with con-
ventional constitutional analysis. In the context of assessing damages
in personal injury cases, the use of race-based and gender-based statis-
tics reflects a history of race and gender prejudice and a denial of
equal employment opportunity. Because the practice reproduces ra-
cial and sexual subordination without serving any compelling or im-
portant governmental interest, it is unconstitutional.
